Mansur Aslanov

If the extent of public confusion is adopted as a measure of success, then the Armenia-Turkey conversation clearly qualifies, based on the contradictory and conflicting statements coming from both the Armenian and Turkish leaders.

The most recent major episode in this saga was Armenian President Sarkisian's visit to Bursa for a soccer game between the two countries last week. Absurdity abounded: The two presidents sat together on Swarovski-encrusted thrones, while Turkish nationalists plottedd to fly into the stadium on a hang glider with an Azerbaijani flag as a reaction to the flag being banned from the game. The founders of the first Azerbaijan republic of 1918—1920 protected the flag of Turkey throughout Soviet rule, while in the game with Armenia, an Azerbaijani flag was trampled on the ground by the Turkish police after protestors were caught trying to smuggle it in. The image naturally provoked outrage in Azerbaijan.

Ankara's openness to talking with the Armenians is a welcome change, which reflects new confidence and maturity of Turkish society. However, this is being coupled with naïveté in Ankara's regional policies. Most likely, this reflects a slightly superficial and abstract vision of foreign policy colored by ideological stereotypes and, as a result, a failure to see that practice doesn't always live up to theoretical constructs.

The consequences are already visible: the frosty response from Baku, the growing tension in the region and rapidly fading hopes for expanding the strategic East-West natural-gas corridor. Opening the border between Armenia and Turkey at this time is not worth these consequences. Right now, opening the border between Turkey and Armenia would just move a sealed border further east by some hundred kilometers at the expense of alienating Azerbaijan, further weakening Georgia and cutting off strategic access to Central Asia. This is a good deal for Moscow, which controls much of Armenia's economy and for whom the country has long become a burden in search of a new sponsor. For Ankara, this doesn't look that appealing. Turkey is, at the moment, spending credit from the past, when Azerbaijan and Georgia saw Turkey as a more predictable and less haphazard partner. Ironically, Turkey's strategic value was greatly boosted by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Caspian gas pipelines, whereas today the policy Turkey is pursuing is at odds with the policy that paved the way for Ankara's success and strength.

This goes to the emerging pattern of stereotypes and naïveté in foreign policy. Being inclusive of Turkey's own Muslim identity doesn't necessarily require one to immediately bash Israel and playing nice to Moscow shouldn't mean turning a cold shoulder on another traditionally friendly neighbor, Georgia. Inviting the Armenian President to a soccer match and instigating the necessary and overdue discussion of Anatolia's convoluted history certainly should not come with the price tag of insulting and striking a blow to the interests of fraternal Azerbaijan.

A pattern of contradictions and naïveté is emerging in Turkey’s foreign policy. Why would Turkey express its emotionally charged disapproval over the tragic events in Gaza, which do truly deserve condemnation, while so warmly welcoming Serj Sarkisian, who confessed publicly to his participation in the Khojaly massacre? By the way, while Gaza is still populated by Palestinians and led by Hamas, no Azerbaijanis live in Khojaly or on any Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian forces.

For Mr. Sarkisian, this is partly a quest for legitimizing his own rule, marred by unprecedented post-election violence last year in Yerevan, when at least 10 protesters were shot point-blank by security forces. He finally received the coveted Obama phone call and was clearly treated better in Turkey than anywhere else in the world, including Armenia and Russia. Of course, Mr. Sarkisian can be negotiated with and even attend soccer games. However, the image of Turkish hospitality was an overstep, which raised the question of whether Turkey is trying to irritate Azerbaijan as a tactic so that Baku's frustrated response can in turn justify the ratification of the protocols with Armenia, without any progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh talks. If so, it would be a short-sighted tactic. In one lesson of history, in 1938, then British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain signed an agreement condoning Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia, hoping for peace; instead, he just paved a way for a greater war. The real issues of occupation and aggression won't go away simply because it is convenient at the moment to ignore them.

For every country, mistakenly projecting domestic perceptions or ideology onto actual foreign policy decisions is ultimately costly. As the Russians, Iranians, and others have learned, the Caucasus is not a playground for testing abstract theories, but an actual and vital global strategic hub. Turkey can and should play this round very wisely to succeed. However, the visible overconfidence, misreading the magnitude of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for Azerbaijan and the actual threat it poses to the region, and the lack of a rational cost-benefit analysis of trading Azerbaijan for Armenia in Turkey's national interests, as well as surprising obliviousness to the significance of Azerbaijan's national flag to the public sentiment, are just a few of the clear warning signs pointing to Ankara's potential lack of the preparedness for the high-stakes game it is attempting to play.

*Mansur Aslanov is a free-lance writer based in Baku, Azerbaijan.