The substantive failure of the so called "Minsk Group" to find a diplomatic solution to the continuing dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh seems already proven.
The failure is attributable to the too divergent interests of the three countries, the United States, Russia and France, that assume collectively the chairmanship of the Minsk Group and that in fact determine, or at least should determine, the guidelines.
Particularly ambiguous is the position of Washington, which has been suspended for long years since the Clinton administration between Congress where pro-Armenian positions prevail – so much so that the US has repeatedly committed significant funds as "aid" to the Armenian administration of Nagorno-Karabakh – and the White House, where initially Clinton and later George W. Bush always tried to mediate with Baku, above all, in order to maintain essential relationships able to ensure US oil interests in the Caucasus.
The situation became further complicated with the election of Barack Obama, whose uncertainties and ambiguity in foreign policy are now dramatically clear. In the Caucasus, then, it seems that the current US administration lacks any strategy, beyond the now rooted preferential relationship with Georgia. In essence it seems increasingly clear that Congress's position in favour of Armenian demands will prevail, if the current uncertainty from the present commander in chief continues.
No less ambiguous in many respects is the position of Moscow. Even if it's an ambiguity that does not originate from the indecision of the Kremlin – it would be paradoxical to accuse Putin and Medvedev of ambiguity – but from the complicated geopolitical web that Russia is weaving. In fact, in the recent past Moscow has strongly supported the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, helping Armenia in every way, above all by putting it in a position to compete militarily with the much better equipped Azeri army.
This policy contradicts or, better still, has displaced the policy of the long Soviet era, when the Red Tsars of the Kremlin always supported this restless province's affiliation to the Azerbaijan Republic. This also has the function of a geopolitical strategy aimed at building bridges with Turkey, a bridge which consists of Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan with its territorial integrity and includes the critical juncture of Nagorno-Karabakh. The policy of the early post-Soviet years has been abandoned, when the pro-Armenian option seemed to prevail in Moscow (by virtue of religious ties, too – the common sense of belonging to Orthodoxy) and when the containment of Georgian influence was a factor. Anyway today, the Kremlin's Caucasian policy might be about to experience a new evolution. In fact, the birth of the Eurasian Economic Community has of necessity brought Moscow closer to the Turkic-speaking Central Asian countries – notably Kazakhstan, which is the second pillar of this new reality – and is opening it up to a closer dialogue with Ankara.
Turkey is, in fact, in turn interested in the new Eurasian Common Market, for two reasons: first because it is irritated by the doors repeatedly closed by the EU and, second, because entry into the euro-zone now appears much less interesting. So Russian-Turkish dialogue, or dialogue between the Eurasian Common Market and Turkey, opens up new scenarios for the Caucasus and, in particular, Nagorno-Karabakh. Constantly evolving scenarios mean that on the one hand Moscow seems less committed to pro-Armenian positions and more willing to have dialogue with Baku, while Ankara on the other hand has tried to reopen channels of communication with Armenia by softening its support for the Azeris. This has led to a stalemate, which, in future, could be the harbinger of an attempt to resolve the Azeri-Armenian crisis in the broader context of a common Eurasian market. A fascinating prospect which is still a long way off.
Lastly, France, which should represent common European interests within the Minsk Group, appears as usual to determine its position by its own "special" interests as well as domestic issues – first of all, electoral concerns, since Paris has always been very sensitive to the pressure of the Armenian lobby in France. Therefore, the suspicion with which Baku looks at the Minsk Group and its latest initiatives is perfectly understandable; it is a suspicion that originates mainly from the awareness of the underlying imbalance.
In fact, the positions of Armenia have always been much better represented and defended, especially with the effective work of the lobby in Moscow, Washington and Paris. The exercise of this kind of "soft power" has so far overshadowed the historical and cultural claims of the Azeris and, above all, downplayed an objective fact. The continuation of Armenian control – or occupation, as the Azeris call it – of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding provinces has a negative impact on the economic development of not only that region but of the Caucasus as a whole.
The impact is also felt on global geo-economic scenarios, and is severe for Western Europe in particular, which should begin to look at the issue more carefully and stop leaving it to Paris' short-sighted policy.
Andrea Marcigliano writes on history and political philosophy for a number of Italian newspapers.
This article was translated by Ermanno Visintainer of the Vox Populi Study Centre and copy-edited by News.Az.
The article was published in Il Nodo di Gordio.
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