by Zaur Shiriyev, analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The international media has shown renewed interest in the revitalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, which has spawned a number of conferences and meetings. It comes as no surprise that during the Annual Conference on U.S-Turkey relations on 31 October, U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that progress in Armenian-Turkish relations would be a positive step [if] the Turkish government will ratify the Armenian-Turkish protocol. Clinton’s remark that “normalization takes bold choices and strong political will, not only on the part of Turkey, but on the part of all of the countries” indirectly underscored Azerbaijan’s role in this process.
Following the earthquake in Van (a city in south-eastern Turkey), Armenian officials declared their readiness to send a planeload of humanitarian aid to the survivors. The same response came from Israel, indicating that both countries are keen to use the Van eearthquake as a diplomatic tool, to open or revitalize diplomatic relations with Turkey. This “earthquake diplomacy” has a precedent- Greece provided assistance to Turkey, its historical rival, after thousands died in the 1999 Izmit earthquake. It is important to remember, however, that the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey pre-dated Izmit, and that both countries’ foreign ministers (George Papandreou of Greece and Ismail Cem of Turkey) were crucially involved in discussions.
However, as Armenian media coverage shows, the responses of the Armenian government and the Armenian public to the Van earthquake have not been not entirely consistent, a factor which has implications for diplomatic relations. In Armenian Public radio’s 2 November report, Armenian experts discussed the situation of “Armenian monuments”, referring to Van as historical Armenian land. On 24 October, times.am website reported the earthquake in Van was most discussed topic on social media by Armenian users. The tragedy prompted different feelings among Armenians: some expressed sympathy, while others were indifferent. These examples indicate that there is significant variation in public attitudes towards the earthquake, which throws into doubt the Armenian government’s “earthquake diplomacy” strategy- suggesting that it is motivated more by diplomatic image-building and PR concerns than genuine compassion. By its very nature, humanitarian aid must be non-ideological and must underscore the fact that humans, regardless of their differences, are victims of a shared tragedy - this not seen in Armenia.
Given the international media’s interest in the prospects of Turkish-Armenian normalization, the following question must be addressed: what changed two years after the protocols were signed?
Two Years after the Protocols
Exactly two years have passed since Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols in Zurich, one on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the other on the development of bilateral relations. On 29-30 October, important academic discussions were held in Istanbul, under the title, “The Normalization Process between Turkey and Armenia: Prospects for Revitalization”. In attendance were experts from Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan as well as international representatives. This was, significantly, the first time Azerbaijani experts have participated in rapprochement discussions. A number of Armenian experts declared that “the protocols are dead”, but that Track 2 diplomacy (civil society engagement) remains in play. One Armenian expert, Richard Giragosian, expressed his anxiety that [if] the stars don’t realign, and normalization doesn’t return to Track 1 state level, there is a danger that next time we try this it will be that much harder, as he said to press.am on 1 November. It is interesting that Armenian experts are not denying that the Armenian Diaspora will force Turkey’s acknowledgment of the 1915 events as genocide - one Armenian expert presented this attitude in a heartfelt and personalized manner: ‘Denying “genocide” is denying the existence of my grandfather”. By all accounts, most experts agreed that normalization requires progress on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the Minsk Group, and progress in that area does not seem possible [for now].
Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Bullish forecasts, Miscalculations & Mistakes
In fact, despite the hopeful forecasts by some analysts in the wake of the 2009 Turkish-Armenian protocols, an assessment two years on reveals the miscalculations and false assumptions that were made:
1.Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will enable Armenia’s integration to the West
It was assumed both in the West and in Turkey that via the normalization process, Armenia would turn its face to the West. In terms of geography, Armenia’s only access to Europe is via Turkey, and opening the border will be facilitate politically integration to Europe. Improvements in relations between Ankara and Yerevan, most U.S strategists contended, would help not only to stabilize the volatile South Caucasus but also to reduce Armenia’s political and economic dependence on Russia and Iran – which clearly serves American interests.
However, it is common knowledge that for as long as there are Russian military bases inside Armenia and along her borders, and Armenian airspace is under the protection of Russian forces, Armenia can easily resist any sort of pressure from Azerbaijan or Turkey, and can safely deter any threat to forcefully liberate the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. After all, it is clear to Russia and many others that peace with Turkey alone is not enough to integrate Yerevan to West or to reduce Russian influence in this country. This was proven, in part, when Armenia signed an agreement to prolong the lease for Russian military bases on its territory in mid-2010, a move which strengthened Russia’s position in Armenia.
2.Recognition of 1915 events as genocide would not happen with the normalization of relations with Armenia
U.S President Barack Obama explicitly declared during his election campaign that the 1915 events should be recognized by U.S as genocide. Thus, in order to prevent “April Syndrome” – every year the U.S president makes a speech regarding the 1915 events, and Turkey always waits to see whether or not the term “genocide” will be used- the Turkish government chose a way to cooperate with the U.S-led peace and normalization process. The Obama administration played the role of a catalyst rather than a founder, since secret negotiations had already started between the two parties long before Obama was elected. While aiming to reduce international pressure regarding the genocide issue by improving relations with Armenia, Turkey risked losing its closest ally – Azerbaijan. In Armenia, the January 12 2010 session of the Constitutional Court emphasized that Armenia will continue its effort to achieve international recognition of the 1915 events as genocide - and indeed, on March 4 2010, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S voted ‘yes’ with 23-22 votes to HR 252. This development reignited the debates in Turkey about the possible consequences of the U.S’s genocide recognition, and the chances of salvaging the stalled “normalization process” with Armenia.
3.Turkey will happily go against Azerbaijani interests
The miscalculations on Armenia’s part were based on the belief that Turkey would not balk at following policies running counter to Azerbaijani interests, and that the rapprochement would damage this strategic partnership. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations occasionally deteriorated, and sometimes were in crisis, but the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement has also had a positive impact on Turkish-Azerbaijani relations; last year, the two countries signed not only a Strategic Partnership Agreement, but also more recently an agreement regarding selling gas to Turkey. Additionally, NGOs, media, and educational institutions intensified and expanded their relations.
4.Azerbaijan is an observer and will react to the normalization process based on emotions
The opening of the Turkey-Armenia border has been subject to criticism from both the opposition and ruling party in Azerbaijan. When Turkey and Armenia agreed to begin negotiations on diplomatic relations, this raised concerns in government and amongst the Azerbaijani public, across extreme nationalist groups and moderates, giving rise to discussions of Turkey’s policy aims in Armenia. Generally, the public dismissed Turkish attitudes as "naive". The government was not emotional and did not voice its position until the official declaration of the “road map” for Turkish-Armenian relations in April 2009, and the signing of the Protocols in October 2009.
Then Azerbaijan appealed to Turkish public opinion, reaching out across Turkey’s government, political parties, civil society, and population at large, calling upon them to take Azerbaijan’s interests into account. Thus, this process prompted Azerbaijan to exercise its regional veto power, revealing the changing dynamics of international foreign policy, to act in time to protect national interest.
The observer during the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process was Georgia, where public opinion saw the thaw between Turkey and Armenia as a U.S project whereby Georgia’s position region was supposed to be taken over by Armenia. In general, Georgia believed that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would weaken its position as a major transit country in the region, and that Tbilisi would lose its place in energy projects. Secondly, Armenia’s reduced dependency on Georgia would enable it to be more active in supporting Armenian nationalist groups active in the Georgian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, thereby destabilizing the region.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijani political circles remain unopposed to the normalization of Turkish-Armenians relations per se; however, they would like to see this process tied to the withdrawal of Armenian military forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. At present, there is relatively little pressure on Turkey but in anticipation of 2015, which will be the 100th anniversary of the events in 1915, it may increase, and could, as a result, be a crucial date for the protocols. This is the main issue that Turkish policy makers should be thinking about. Undoubtedly the 2012 elections in Georgia, Russia and Armenia - as well as in the France and U.S - will change the political face of the region and beyond, and these changes will resonate internationally. This could be an opportunity, but it is also true that there is less chance of peace being achieved close to elections.
Conclusion
In this context, it is of particular importance that the U.S. and the EU get more seriously involved in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if they want to see tangible progress in the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkish-Armenian negotiations brought about the signing of the protocols in 2009, in which the leaders of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs countries were involved; Azerbaijanis want to see same “picture” for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In short: the protocol-based normalization process will neither end campaigns for the recognition of the 1915 events as genocide nor necessarily advance the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as long as the process remains in limbo. Overcoming the traditional way of thinking is necessary in order to change the status quo in the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish triangle. Armenia must foresee the implications of its policy decisions in the context of the broader geopolitical agenda of the Caucasus. Azerbaijan will accept the opening of the Armenian –Turkish border, but because the reason for closing it in 1993 was Armenia’s occupation of the Azerbaijani district of Kelbajar, this move will not change the dynamics of conflict resolution; nor contribute to the foreseeable revitalization of Turkish-Armenian relations at the level of Track 1 diplomacy.
Zaur Shiriyev is a Foreign Policy Analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan and the Executive Editor of Caucasus International journal.
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