Interview with Maksym Maiorov, an expert at the Nomos Centre for the study of the Black Sea region, based in Stavropol, Ukraine.
Q: How would you describe the current military and political situation in the South Caucasus which is full of unresolved conflicts? Is it highly explosive?
A: These conflicts have long been viewed as "frozen", but the events of 2008 showed that a return to a "hot phase" is quite possible. Though in fact since the early 1990s the military and political situation in the South Caucasus has never been calm: the contact line in Karabakh is in fact a front line where people die all the time. The same can be said of the entire section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. It is another matter whether new hostilities are possible and what can influence this. Unlike when these conflicts erupted, today everything is bound more closely to the broad format of international relations.
This means that direct parties to the conflict cannot ignore the geopolitical interests of the leading regional players and even in the case of escalation the initiative may come from big, neighbouring states, which we already saw three years ago. In this light, we should rather speak of the conflicts' manageability than of their explosiveness.
Some unexpected developments may happen, for example, the internal sociopolitical situation in the South Caucasus countries may worsen to the extent that war is perceived as the only chance for governments to retain power, or power may be seized by populists who do not feel constrained by international obligations.
Q: Russia is often accused of having an interest in preserving conflicts in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, over the past two to three years Moscow has been playing a very active mediatory role in the Karabakh settlement. What do you think prompted this activeness?
A: Russia’s activeness is dictated by the growing competition from other peacekeepers and by the desire to rehabilitate itself after the, to put it mildly, incorrect behaviour in Georgia in 2008. Moscow still perceives the South Caucasus as its sphere of exceptional interests. However, unlike its desires, every year Russia finds it more and more difficult to preserve its influence, since Western countries and broad international cooperation promise more significant benefits to the Caucasian states: these are energy projects, economic modernization overall, technology, social standards and so on. Russia is merely unable to offer a worthy alternative to this all. Therefore, only mediation in conflicts and support for undemocratic regimes remain Moscow's factors of influence in the region. Is Russia interested in the final resolution of these conflicts?
Q: The EU also takes an active position on the Karabakh settlement. Do you think the EU’s interests and activity in this respect (including as part of Eastern Partnership initiatives and so on) supplement or contradict the interests and activity of Russia?
A: As I have already said, the peacekeeping initiatives of Russia and West are competitive despite the overall format of the Minsk Group. Unfortunately for Azerbaijan, this competition does not mean that in counterbalance to Moscow Brussels is sincerely striving for the fair resolution of the Karabakh conflict.
Mediation in the Karabakh settlement for the governments of the European countries and EU leadership is not a priority but an opportunity to test out their foreign policy capabilities, an optional load in the mission of preserving stability in the remote periphery and testing ground for new energy transportation projects. If Azerbaijan wishes to use the advantages of European diplomacy, it should seize the initiative and promote its interesting proposals in Europe rather than wait for the EU to reach its decisions of Solomon.
Q: What is the potential of other players - Iran and Turkey - to solve this conflict, given their willingness to help the conflict parties agree?
A: Azerbaijan should primarily rely on itself in the process of resolving the Karabakh conflict rather than on its close and distant neighbours. The best way out would be to personally convince the Armenian side that Azerbaijan is right, however difficult it may seem. All mediators pursue their own goals which often run counter to fine declarations. We have already seen the recent attempts by Turkey to assume the role of a guardian in the South Caucasus. I know that the Azerbaijani side was concerned when the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations including the opening of the border was discussed. In terms of Turkish national interests it was probably an attractive idea to become "a big brother" to all these states, including Armenia, even putting at risk its strategic relations with Azerbaijan. Certainly, the greater part of Turkish society expressed their solidarity with Azerbaijanis, but can we expect Ankara to play along with Baku all the time?
Iran’s peacekeeping initiatives should also be viewed within the context of their own domestic problems. Tehran is trying to fight the implications of their not irreproachable international reputation. Events in Libya showed the implications a bad international reputation may have. The issue is whether Iranian mediation is worth Azerbaijan putting relations at risk with Western countries?
Q: Will Azerbaijan use its recently obtained status as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to attract the attention of the superpowers to Karabakh, if not to revive the four resolutions of the UN Security Council?
A: Of course, the UN Security Council is a good area for Azerbaijan to draw world attention to Karabakh. It is very important to understand the real value of this instrument – its advantages and its limitations. In short, the opportunity is the ability to raise a topic at a high level, find new supporters and allies. All the same, it should be understood that the composition of permanent members of the UN Security Council and the Minsk Group co-chairs coincide which is why it is impossible to expect that these countries will take more notice of Azerbaijan all of a sudden.
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