by Cem Oguz, head of the Turkish Center for Strategic and International Studies.
As an expert on Russia, I was frequently asked in the 1990’s to comment on the turbulent and often confrontational course of Turkish-Russian relations. All interviewers were particularly keen to find out how a more promising relationship could be achieved.
I remember, each time I had pointed out the existence of psychological constraints that revolved around mutual misperceptions as the basic handicap. The persistent lack of understanding prevalent among both sides’ ruling elite was the main source of mistrust. I suggested that, in time, the unique geopolitics of both countries, having left deep marks on their historical progress and bilateral relations alike, would inevitably force them to adopt more constructive approach. They would eventually realize that their interests overlap, rather than clash. The most crucial thing to be done was to establish an environment of mutual trust that would overcome elements of paranoid suspicion, which were particularly epidemic among the Russian elite.
Years have passed since then, and history has proven me right. Although being still too early yet to assert relations have developed into a strategic partnership, as is widely held among both countries’ publics, bilateral cooperation has reached the stage of a profound multi-dimensional partnership.
The main drive behind this astonishing progress has come from Russia itself. In the past, the anti-Turkey lobby in Russia, consisted mainly of security elites and, to a lesser extent, ultra-communist and nationalist deputies of the Duma, considered Turkey a proxy of Russia’s arch military adversaries, the U.S. and NATO. The foreign policy they designed was based on an ultimate power projection. Due to the ambitions they advanced with regard to Russia’s sphere of influence, or the so-called “near abroad,” their perception of Turkey appeared to have been that of a rival and traditional enemy.
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, however, Russia’s decision-making process and foreign policy understanding have dramatically changed. Indeed, the most crucial feature of Putin’s leadership is his visionary realism. As I wrote in one of my previous analyses, having discerned that, for the present, any rivalry in foreign policy, particularly with the U.S., would be costly for a Russia that lacks the necessary resources, Putin has prioritized economic interests in his foreign policy conduct. Geopolitical ambitions have been replaced by geo-economical aspirations. Trying to make the most of Russia’s few assets, he has increasingly relied on the export of energy resources. Henceforth, the creation of an energy dependence on Russia, by its neighbors in particular, has become Moscow’s primary foreign policy goal. The reason Turkey has been elevated to the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda is closely related to Putin’s strategic expectation in that regard.
Putin’s ultimate success in establishing solid authority over the Russian bureaucracy, which was in a state of disarray during the late Boris Yeltsin era, has had positive implications on the perception of Turkey by the Russian establishment. While Moscow has been increasingly attracted by Turkey’s growing energy needs as well as military and privatization tenders, the influence of those who would increase enmity between the two countries needed to be neutralized. Economic actors’ subsequent involvement in foreign policy formation and the rising sympathy towards Turkey, even among the ranks of the anti-Turkey lobby as a result of the Turkish parliament’s denial of U.S. demands for Iraq in March 2003, facilitated things for Putin. Ironically, many members of the anti-Turkey lobby have become the most enthusiastic supporters of the improvement of multilateral ties with Turkey.
In the 2000s, there were two basic factors that contributed to the further development of bilateral relations. First, the Action Plan on Cooperation in Eurasia, signed in November 2001, is the eventual manifestation of the political rapprochement between the two countries. It signifies both capitals have finally acknowledged that cooperation in the vast Eurasian area is the basic prerequisite for regional stability. The calls for consultation as well as confidence-building measures envisaged in the agreement provide promising perspectives that may lead into a real strategic partnership in the near future. Second important factor was the rise in Turkey of Justice and Development Party to power. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy understanding has had a very positive impact on the improvement of relations.
Nonetheless, it would be too early yet to claim that all the problems are being eliminated. Ankara’s expectations from Moscow on the handling of the Cyprus problem in the UN Security Council as well as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-oriented terror are still being not met by Russia. Additionally, Turkey expects Russia to exert more influence on Armenia regarding the resolution to the Karabakh problem.
C. Cem Oguz This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
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