Interview with Svante E. Cornell, Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, and a co-founder of the Institue for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm
- After the Kazan meeting of two presidents, the negotiation process around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict went to the deadlock. How long do you believe that the stagnation process around the conflict resolution will continue?
- Well, I think that in the future there is nothing that shows that there is going to be a significant change in the negotiations or significant progress. I never believed that Kazan meeting is going anywhere. What happens now is that the conflict has been put on the international backburner and there is no serious engagement of the part of the mediators or anyone else.
- Concerning the mediators, can you say that the position of the international mediators in the face of the Minsk group is being biased?
- I think that the co-chairs are from the different perspectives. The Russian co-chair has very clear and direct interest in the conflict, which is not necessarily to the one or another country but to maintain both in the state of weakness, maintain Russian predominance in the Caucasus, and as Azerbaijan is a strong country, there are leaning towards Armenia. In the principle I think it is a very pragmatic policy. If you look at the French and the US policy I don’t think that there is a bias as such. In fact, in Azerbaijan people are complaining the lack of the objectivity, in Armenia people are saying that all these countries are supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, therefore they are biased. I think France and the US you will find the influence of the certain lobby but in the US it is the congressional issue.
- Considering the Russian role in this conflict can we estimate it from the perspective of the military cooperation between Moscow and Yerevan?
- Of course, the military base and the mutual agreement. At the same time they are selling arms to Azerbaijan as well. I usually say that they are selling arms to Armenia on the cheap prices and to Azerbaijan on the expensive prices.
- During the latest meeting to the region, the co-chairs proposed new options to the both sides. Do you think that it may contribute to rule out this deadlock in the process?
- No, because the co-chairs acting in isolation don’t have political capital. What is necessary something to be achieved and the deadlock to be broken that there is to be high level serious international engagement. The co-chairs are middle level diplomats, they are not senior people in any capacity. I am sure that they are very skilled diplomats, but still are mid-career level diplomats. They are not the type of people, the US for example are sending to the Middle East, to the North Korea, or to Afghanistan. I will keep saying no until there is an appointment of the serious senior figures as the presidential envoy in the US. The moment that there is a person with a serious experience in the conflict resolution, which is important than experience in the region, and who has improved statue to make a policy and not only to improve the discussion, then there will be a serious possibility to break through.
- This year Azerbaijan got the membership in the Security Council in the UN, how do you see the contribution of it to the solution of the conflict?
- I don’t think it contributes at all to the conflict, directly. Indirectly it amends the development that has been taking place for many years that Azerbaijan is increasing in the region and in the world and will be able to raise the issue in the Security Council. But in terms of the actual policy, it may be used in the way to be productive but I still think it will not make change, and the most serious problem is the lack of the Western strategy towards the South Caucasus.
- Speaking from the European perspective, why do you think that European Union pretends to be silent in the Karabakh process?
- I think for several reasons, one is that France would like to maintain its supremacy as a European country in Minsk group alongside with Russia and the US. The another is the internal problems of the EU: if you look at the entire policy, the whole existence of the EU is in the question for financial and economic reasons and this is not a good time to make a sort of engagement in its eastern neighborhood. It is not an amazing thing but at least they have done it. But in the couple of years or the nearest future, we should not expect very much unless there is a bog crisis in the region that force the international community to act. I think in that respect, the third reason, there is what you can call the Karabakh fatigue, and number two is that time goes by and the status quo is more accepted. The conflict is not the frozen and that is the problem. And I think what happened in the past two years that the US have sent the signal to Azerbaijan that this is not the priority and please accept that this is not going to be priority. And Azerbaijan has a choice either to accept it to do something about it, and that meant that you need to escalate the conflict, and that what Baku did.
- And do you think that the current situation can lead to the breaking up of a new war in the region?
- Yes, of course. It is always much easier and cheaper to prevent a war, than intervene one to start it. And that should have done in Georgia. The EU had to spend enormous political capital and financial resources for Georgian economy in three billion dollar. If it had invested the half before the war, they probable would be able the escalation of the war. The international community should do is one thing, and what they will do is another.
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