Interview with Sergey Markedonov, visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, USA.
Q: Can the upcoming 2012 presidential elections in Russia influence the country’s policy toward its neighbors from the post-Soviet space?
A: I don’t think there will be any principal changes in foreign policy. The matter is that elections and the overall political cycle which is to start refers to inner processes, first of all.
I am sure that any outcome of elections will not mean the quality change in foreign policy priorities including in the post-Soviet space. This, certainly, will not mean that Russia will give up recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because the problem in South Caucasus persists. Russia will also not make a final choice in favor of Armenia or Azerbaijan on Nagorno Karabakh. Whoever is elected the president, Russia will continue balancing, because these are the interests and the resources of the country. I think that strategic issues will not change radically or strongly.
Most will certainly depend on more global aspects in connection with the election campaign in our country and in the United States, which is already gaining steam.
Here it is very important that the foreign policy is largely a captive of inner political processes and the rhetoric of Americans and Russians does not reflect the complexity of real relations. Real policy is often taken for rhetoric. In fact, the situation is not like that. Therefore, the main task for Russia and the United States is that the election rhetoric shall not change cardinally the real nature of relations, which are certainly more complicated. There are common stands, there are differences, but now we cannot speak of any cold war and other things.
Q: You have recently taken part in the conference on conflicts in the post-Soviet space. What were the overall impressions of the discussions?
A: The conference was quite interesting. For example, there was a separate topic on de-facto states. It is very important since no attention is paid to them and they are viewed only in the aspect of the geopolitical rivalry of the United States and Russia.
It was quite an interesting session on international interference, international context around the conflict, the conflicts themselves. The composition of participants was quite good. These were Tom de Vaal, Denis Summut, Cori Welt and others, quite a sufficient number of professional specialists. Georgian ambassador in the United States Jacobashvili was a small exception. I am not against participation of Georgian experts, I have many friends among them but I think that the scientific conferences must primarily be attended by scientists and experts rather than diplomats. Or then it was necessary to invite the ambassadors of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the conference, if we want to discuss the situation with diplomats. I am against mixing genres. Diplomats must deal with diplomacy and scientists must analyze the situation. And when they gather together, it becomes the unnecessary politicization of the problem, which is no good.
Q: What was the result of the discussions?
A: No results should be expected. Experts are often asked about what they offer in practical sense. I cannot demand a president to do something. My task is different-to give analysis and then offer-it is already the case of not experts but people working in the government who can use anything of expert assessments.
Thus, the task of the conference was not the issue of any practical recommendation but the competent analysis of the situation. To my mind, this competent analysis was voiced and it is among the main results of the conference.
Certainly, there was no common stance among participants given that different scientists with different extent of objectiveness were gathered. This is good since truth emerges in debates and different views on the problem rather help than hinder.
Q: What is the possibility of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war for Nagorno Karabakh due to the long absence of progress in negotiations?
A: The possibility of new full-pledged war seems unlikely to me. There are no principal grounds for it, including the complete military superiority of Azerbaijan and its total international support. All other options make blitzkrieg impossible, while it is not profitable to start a positioning war, primarily for Baku, since international implications are too great.
Q: How effective can be the initiatives, including of Baku, of the need to intensify contacts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis of Nagorno Karabakh and overall, between the representatives of the civil community of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?
A: Initiatives on civil contacts can only be welcomed. People’s communication is an important resource for reconciliation of the two societies. However, the case will not go too far without political will in Yerevan and Baku, mutual concessions and compromises (mutual ones!!!). It would be naïve to think that the Minsk Group, Russia, United States or EU will make this work for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, civil contacts can be a good background factor for legitimacy of concessions and compromises among citizens of the two countries.
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