Interview with Dr Sezai Ozcelik, head of the International Relations Department at Cankiri Karatekin University.
Q: Most view the decision of the French parliament on criminalizing the denial of genocide, especially denial that the 1915 killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide, as extremely politicized. What do you think about it?
A: The French Senate's decision about the denial of genocide is mostly politically motivated. I would like to emphasize that it is mostly political, but from the conflict resolution point of view, it can be explained through pscyhoanalysis and group psychology. Like everybody else, it is possible to say that all sides in the issue (France, Turkey, the Armenian diaspora, Armenia as well as Azerbaijan), the issue of genocide is mostly political.
According to the conflict resolution perspective, group dynamics, chosen trauma and psychological wounds play an important role in the French Senate's decision. By applying this law to Turkey, they have tried to put Turkey in the same category as Germany. Although the European Union project is designed to produce peace and reconciliation between Germany and France, past history has still played an important role. In terms of deep-group psychology and wounds, France has not dealt with its chosen trauma with Germany.
In every book about the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, it is possible to read that Hitler learned from the Armenian genocide which was the first genocide in modern times. I think it may be true that the Senate decision is mostly a matter of domestic politics, but from another perspective, it may be necessary to look behind the reasons into the underlying causes. So my understanding is this: on the one hand, France has tried to combine Turkey and Germany together so it can deal with its wounded self image about the First World War when the Ottoman Empire was allied with Germany.
So through this decision, it is playing not only Armenian French voters; like other European countries, France has not faced its troubled history over the Holocaust and the Algerian Massacre. Before the denial of genocide became a crime, the French Senate passed a law making the denial of the Holocaust a crime. We know that France played an important role during the Holocaust. Although not to the extent of a German, a French person may have been crushed by guilt about the Holocaust. So French Senate decisions have become tools to spread guilt to other countries. It is not easy for anyone to deal with self-image and easier to deal with the image of the other. By portraying the other as an enemy, a person or group tries to improve its self-image but to worsen the other's image. It is convenient to blame another rather than ourselves. Of course, this is true for the Turkish side. If Turkey had dealt with this issue a long time ago, it would not have become an international political issue.
In short, the French Senate decision is not only politically motivated but also has some group psychological roots. We cannot only explain the French motive by political theories but deeper psychological causes.
Q: How far can the crisis in relations between Ankara and Paris lead?
A: The relationship between states can be affected by short-term tactical manoeuvres but if there is a strategic change in the relationship, long-term interests may change and transform the relations between two states. Second, mutual interdependence may overcome short-term interests. Third, Turkey has not voiced its concerns about decisions taken by 24 countries on the genocide issue. Without any new policy on the genocide issue, Turkey may not change this trend anywhere. Especially since 2015 is an important date, the pressure on Turkey will increase tremendously.
So the decision may affect the Turkish-French relationship for a short time. If we explain it in economic terms, Turkey and France will reach a new equilibrium point. In the interdependent world, both France and Turkey will move toward mutual understanding and a compromise solution. It also depends on the results of the French election. After the election, relations may become more stable. One of the worst effects of this decision is that Turkey will move slowly toward more democracy and human rights and take some decisions that do not help it to face its own history. There is a need for more internal discussions about the Armenian question in Turkey and outside forces like France have not helped the situation.
Q: What can Turkey do to protest against the decision of the French lawmakers?
A: Turkey has taken some measures about the French Senate decision. Right now, they are at the "wait and see" stage. Turkey hopes that the French Constitutional Council will annul the law on the grounds of freedom of speech. If the Constitutional Council does not reverse the law, Turkey may take more serious measures including sanctions. Can they be effective? I don't think so because there is a high degree of mutual interdependence. In fast changing regional and global trends, Turkey will not have permanent foes or friends but vital national interests, namely security and survival.
If the situations in Syria, Iran and Iraq change, Turkey may act in concert with the European allies, namely France and Great Britain, as in the case of Libya. Because of the fast changing balance of power around Turkey, Turkey will find itself new crises in the coming weeks. In short, Turkey's vital interests put the crisis in Turkish-French relations to lower levels in Turkey's foreign policy.
Q: How do you explain Sarkozy's hostile attitude towards Turkey?
A: My explanation of Nicolas Sarkozy's decisions about Turkey is rooted in psychological causes. Sarkozy's troubled past (his father and grandfather) may be surfacing in his policy about Turkey. As mentioned above, in order to suppress his guilt, he may use Turkey to overcome this guilt factor. Second, Sarkozy's political moves on Turkey may be related to the Eurozone crisis. By diverting attention to these issues, Sarkozy hopes political discussion will cocentrate on politics, not economic issues. In Europe, there is a trend to deepen and not enlarge the EU (although Crotia is to become the 28th member).
But like any economic crisis, there is a possibility of producing a scapegoat. During the 1930s, the scapegoating targeted the Jews in Europe. It is possible that Islamophobia in general and Turkophobia in particular may increase in Europe. And Turks may become a scapegoat in Europe. Also, Europe may withdraw into its shell. Although the solution of the Eurozone crisis has to be global, the mercantile trend may increase and Turkey may need new allies. On the one hand, the Middle East crisis makes Turkey have more aggressive policies towards its neighbours. On the other hand, the Eurozone crisis and the presidency of Cyprus in the EU make Turkey move away from the EU objective.
Q: What can Turkey and Azerbaijan do to prevent the Armenian diaspora from achieving what they did in France?
A: For the Armenian diaspora, the issue of genocide is the cornerstone of its identity. The genocide issue cannot be explained by history. Most importantly, it is an issue of identity and group pscyhology. Without some sort of compromise among the parties (Turkey, the Armenian diaspora, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other parties), the Armenian diaspora will continue this pressure by using the same law in other European countries. In identity issues, the solution rests on the satisfaction of a basic human need, namely identity.
As long as the genocide continues to be the Armenian díaspora's basic human need (identity), other countries, and not only European ones, will adopt a similar law. Turkey and Azerbaijan can prevent this by engaging more grassroots and citizen-to-citizen diplomacy. Apart from track-one diplomacy, it is possible to produce some win-win solutions via problem-solving workshops (PSWs) among the conflicting parties. With the help of a third party, the conflicting parties may find some solutions not only to the genocide issue but also to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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