There is a strange similarity in the knee-jerk reactions of parties and quarters in Turkey and Armenia (as well as hard-line members of the Armenian diaspora) against the efforts at rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan.
Ultra-nationalists on both sides see a “
The “genocide” and the “Karabakh” issues are, not surprisingly, at the heart of the heated arguments raging on this score. On the Turkish side, those who rabidly oppose rapprochement with Armenia claim that the Erdo“an government has broken its promise to Azerbaijan not to normalize ties with Armenia until Armenian forces evacuate occupied Azeri territory.
They accuse Prime Minister Erdo“an himself of reneging on his remarks to the Azeri legislature in Baku not so long ago, and maintain that Ankara has disengaged the Karabakh issue from the issue of normalization of ties with Armenia.
Oddly and ironically, Armenian ultra-nationalists, starting with the Dashnak Party, are also claiming a “Karabakh
Put another way, Turkey has, according to this point of view, embedded this issue with great diplomatic subtlety and skill, in between the lines of the protocols, and has thus “check-mated” the Armenian government.
This odd dichotomy “which indicates both nations carry similar masochistic tendencies” is enough to show that hardliners in the two countries are not concerned with the actual texts of the protocol, which happen to be very balanced, but are more concerned with their own agendas, and therefore see what they want to see in a process that they despise.
The same is true about the “genocide” issue. Ultra-nationalists on the Turkish side maintain that the proposed joint history commission, to be set up by the two countries at the inter-governmental level, is basically “designed to feed to Turks the genocide argument under the guise of objective historical research.”
To bolster this claim they recall the fact that President G“l, when foreign minister, had said that Turkey would accept the findings of the history commission, which will also include third-party participants to enhance its objectivity.
Again the reverse mirror image of this situation on the Armenian side is that ultra-nationalists are claiming just the opposite, namely that the proposed history commission is basically designed to “obfuscate” the issue and “contextualize the genocide,” thus diminishing Turkish responsibility for the events of 1915.
Given such hard-line positions, it is evident that the governments in the two countries are on their own as far as this process is concerned. In other words there will be no help forthcoming from opposition parties.
Fortunately for those who believe in the importance of this rapprochement process, the government's in both countries are strong and have enough numbers in parliament to have the two protocols in question passed, as they have to be according to the road map laid down.
Reports suggest that it is a foregone conclusion that the government in Armenia will have its day in Parliament, despite the angry voices from a vociferous opposition and a diaspora that is totally against any rapprochement with Turkey.
The picture is a little more complicated in Turkey, where, for all its shortcomings, the democratic process is more developed that in Armenia, as seen in the last few elections held in that country.
Put another way, the Erdo“an government is not only in a position to convince the opposition, which it clearly will not be able to do, but is also in the position of having to convince its own deputies that this process with Armenia does not entail a
One recalls here the way many Justice and Development Party, or AKP, deputies voted against the government's bill in March 2003 that would have enabled the U.S. military to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq. That bill had failed, with historic consequences, not because the opposition voted against it in Parliament, but because many government deputies voted against it.
It remains to be seen if the government succeeds in convincing its group in Parliament this time. There are factors however that will work to its advantage.
Firstly AKP deputies who vote against the protocols with Armenia will do so in the full knowledge that they will be weakening the governing party at a sensitive time, when it is trying to tackle not just the Armenian question, but also the Kurdish and Cyprus issues.
There is an expectation, therefore, that party discipline will hold firmer this time, as compared to the Iraq bill in 2003. There is also the fact that a strong international desire for rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia has crystallized, with governments and international organizations lauding this process.
Put another way, the 's poilers” in this case, will be noted negatively by international public opinion, and this applies to the Armenian side, as it does to the Turkish side. The Armenian diaspora is working hard, despite this desire of the international community's , to be that spoiler. So is the ultranationalist opposition in Turkey.
Who will carry the day is still an open question, despite positive signs that the process will proceed as planned. According to the road map the two protocols in question will first be signed by the two foreign ministers on Oct. 13, a day before President Sarkisian arrives in Bursa for the Turkey-Armenia soccer match. They will then be sent to the two Parliaments to be voted on.
What is certain is that a failure in this process will have dire consequences for the two countries and the two nations, and will represent a historic opportunity missed. That is why the ultranationalists on both sides must not be allowed to carry the day. Especially when it is clear that they are more concerned with their own political interests than anything else.
Semih Idiz / Hurriyet Daily News
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