HistoryofTruth.com - Armenian Allegations

Interview of Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow and programme director for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

Q: What is NATO's role in the South Caucasus?

A: I think NATO certainly plays a definite role in this region but as one of the players. I think NATO has never been the main guarantor of security in this region. At the same time, NATO fulfills an important role in encouraging reform in the security sector, helping regional countries to effectively develop their military policy and establishing civilian control over the armed structures, supporting the interaction of different force structures in this region and establishing real modern armed forces and a society that understands the military policy of the state. But I cannot imagine that NATO can guarantee either the resolution of conflicts or react to possible security threats from the outside, especially a possible threat from Russia's side or the threat of escalation of regional conflicts. On the other hand, certainly, we are now at a crossroads when the whole system of European and Euro-Atlantic security is changing.

A very dangerous security vacuum formed for the region after last year's war in August. Not only has the process of NATO expansion stopped, other organizations are also not actively involved here. The OSCE and UN are also transforming after these missions were closed both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU, certainly, plays a more important role today, but it has not yet become a player in regional security that has a really serious long-term strategy in this region. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is also in crisis; the resolutions on creating a rapid reaction collective force have seen no progress and, on the whole, Russia did not show itself to be an effective military player during the August war. What we see now in terms of military reforms in Russia will certainly last for many years. Therefore, the situation here is too unstable and that are not really any players that could settle regional problems effectively. Therefore, I think some initiatives from the region are needed for the regional countries to define the regional architecture of their security. This active approach from the region seems more relevant to me.

Q: Do you think Georgia's and Azerbaijan's NATO membership is realistic?

A: I think it is completely unrealistic. I do not see any provisions under which it could be realistic, except if NATO transforms into a framework security structure of global concern in the coming decade. But I do not see any prospects of membership of NATO as a serious military alliance, mostly based on Article 5 (which says that an attack on any NATO member is considered an attack on all).

Q: Can NATO accept the South Caucasus as an exception to settle the conflicts inside the organization? For example, the Council of Europe once accepted Azerbaijan and Armenia with the same provision of settling the Karabakh problem as soon as possible?

A: No, NATO will never take this step. For example, it still has an unsettled conflict between Turkey and Greece which, certainly, differs from the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia and has a longer history. Therefore, I think NATO will never import new conflicts under any conditions, especially conflicts that may lead to Russia's armed interference in certain conditions. NATO will not risk its fundamental security to accept countries that do not comply with the membership criteria. One of these criteria is the mandatory settlement of borders and conflict issues in the areas of the countries accepted to the alliance. I do not think we will be able to settle these conflicts in the near future.

Q: How do you see the prospects of the Karabakh conflict settlement?

A: I see it as a long-lasting steady process to be based on a series of agreements that will gradually settle the process and start building a more serious dialogue primarily between the conflict parties and the important players in this region. I understand the just concerns of the Azerbaijani side due to the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. But I think Azerbaijan's concerns are not exaggerated here, for according to history 15 years of closed borders were not effective. It means we should try a different option under which attention will be focused on the settlement of regional conflicts by way of a general settlement once borders are opened. And I think Turkey's role in this process is very important. Turkey can play a greater role than it has before and the opening of the border with Armenia will raise Turkey's role in this process which will have a positive impact on the transformation of the atmosphere around the resolution of this conflict.

Q: Don't you think that Armenia will not need to think of the accelerated settlement of the conflict after opening the border with Turkey?

A: Certainly not. The opening of borders with Turkey will not settle the fundamental problem for Armenia — the problem of security. It means that there will also be a situation when this conflict may enter a military phase again. We understand this and Armenia understands that the situation is not staying idle while the situation in Azerbaijan is changing, its economy is developing along with the military potential and there will never be fundamental security in Armenia until the the conflict is resolved. Without fundamental security, there will be neither investments nor economic development. Therefore, I think the border opening does not remove the conflict settlement from the agenda. On the contrary, I think the border opening will put Armenia in a situation when it has to contact the world. It will not be isolated anymore and it will be unable to shout to the world “we are isolated, we are in a blockade, therefore, we will not do anything, because we are threatened”. It will show itself to be a responsible player in the region that should be more actively involved in the conflict settlement. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs mention progress in the negotiation process. Therefore, I do not think there are any real examples of negative trends in negotiations.

Q: But Azerbaijan’s president has said that as a result of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, the Armenian side has stiffened its stance in the negotiations and chosen to drag out the talks. Does this show that Armenia is more reluctant to make concessions?

A: I think the policy of protracting negotiations is a policy that has existed for many years beginning with Key West and Rambouillet (talks in 2001 and 2006 respectively) and it has always been like that. Both parties have lingered over negotiations as it is clear that any conflict settlement proposes a compromise solution. I heard the co-chairs say no serious changes in the strategy are observed. Certainly, it is for your president to judge, as he is an indirect participant in the private talks. But we, as experts who hear what is said in the public arena, have never heard this.

Q: Don't you think that the world community represented by the three co-chairing countries of the OSCE Minsk Group is not interested in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict? When they needed normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations, they could put pressure on Turkey and Armenia for them to sign the well-known protocols while in case with Karabakh the mediators say the parties are responsible for the settlement of the conflict?

A: I do not think so. They are certainly interested. But they are not interested in the next failure in the second or third Key-West. I think pressure is still felt. We have recently seen the Meindorff process and the fact that the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders had numerous meetings this year, proves that the process is proceeding, there is a dynamics and the issue is on the agenda. Naturally, everyone realized after the August war that it is impossible to have an approach of “postponing this conflict for an indefinite period and let them deal with this problem independently”. Everyone has realized that at the time when the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia entered the stage when it is impossible to imagine how to start settling these conflicts, we should not allow the Karabakh problem following this example. This is because there is a wider political will, more attention and interest to the settlement of the Karabakh problem. I think the Turkish-Armenian process has raised the issue of the Karabakh conflict on the agenda of the EU, US and Russia and this is very important for had it not been for the Turkish-Armenian process, US attention would have been on Afghanistan or somewhere else. This is also positive that Turkey is more actively involved in this process and it tries to do something. I think there will be the results for it became clear after the August war that the conflict settlement is not the issue of the coming 20—30 years. It should become an issue of the coming years. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine the immediate settlement of the conflict, but at least it will remain on the agenda and major superpowers will undoubtedly continue efforts.

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