Towards the end of this year, several important developments are taking place that should clarify the likelihood of the peaceful resolution of the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan on terms consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions, OSCE statements and the wishes of the majority of people in the South Caucasus, namely cessation of Karabakh’s occupation by Armenia and withdrawal of its military from there in exchange for a number of significant concessions by Azerbaijan ranging from economic and trade, to the political status of a high-level autonomy for the region.
One is the upcoming Dec. 7 visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan to the United States on the invitation of President Obama. While a whole range of issues will be discussed, as U.S. needs Turkey on the issues of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the Muslim world in general, but Caucasus, especially the Turkey-Armenia land border opening
Another important development is the final meeting for this year between President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Serge Sarkisian of Armenia in Munich on Nov. 22, under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group
Additional tectonic shifts are seen in the energy geopolitics, with Azerbaijan signing an agreement to send its ever-expanding gas production north to Russia, as well as expressing interest in supplying gas to China via a reverse Trans-Caspian pipeline via Turkmenistan. Needless to say, this would undermine the problem-plagued Nabucco pipeline, since gas to fill it from Iraq is not reliable, Iranian option is opposed by the United States, while supplies from Egypt are still
These prospects of multibillion-dollar losses to Turkey are because of unsound politics and flawed strategy by the AKP. Consider the following hollow “gains” Turkey will get — according to U.S. Ambassador Yovanovitch, only 1 percent to 3 percent per year increase in trade with Armenia would ensue from the open land border (currently turnover stands at only $200 million at most). Also, the supposed abandoning of the Armenian claims internationally and particularly in the U.S. Congress, which the Armenian diaspora, which is fully independent from the Republic of Armenia, has already sternly stated they would not, and cannot, abandon their raison d’être (and U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid along with dozens of Congressmen, unequivocally stating they will continue introducing and supporting anti-Turkish resolutions). The same was actually stated by Armenia’s Ambassador-at-large Arkady Ghukasyan, a close confidante of President Sarkisian, in
What is the only realistic way out of this conundrum that can and should be done by Turkey in the current geopolitical climate. The two principal parties of the conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan, have shown different valuations, the extent to which they can make concessions and be expected to negotiate on. Whilst for Azerbaijan the Karabakh problem is by far the most important — a USAID-funded poll found that 93 percent Azerbaijanis consider it their #1 problem — while for a similar USAID poll in Armenia the problem of NK was ranked only third, being most important for just 24 percent of Armenians. Whereas late President Heydar Aliyev found it impossible to accept the Key West peace proposals in 2001 because of the tremendous opposition by the Azerbaijani public and Parliament, in Armenia the public opinion places lesser importance and the opposition dismissed by the government, as can be determined not only from U.S. polls, but the March 2008 post-election violence, in which President Sarkisian did not shy away from leaving at least 10 protesters dead (according to unofficial sources, over 40 protesters died). In 2009, many Armenian protesters opposing President Sarkisian’s readiness to sign the Turkey-Armenia protocols, were either beaten (France), or detained (Los Angeles and Beirut), and in conversations with the diaspora leaders the Armenian president mocked the 10,000 protestors crowd, saying he too can amass as many counter-protesters if needed.
This shows that the Azerbaijani government and public have offered their maximum level of concessions — that is high-degree autonomy for the Armenian community of Karabakh within Azerbaijan, along with full restoration of relations with Armenia — from which the Azerbaijani side cannot fall back even more. Meanwhile, the Armenian side, which has proven it can silence opposition by any means necessary while strengthening its regime, and was ready to compromise (or betray, as some ultranationalists in the Armenian diaspora allege) in some ways on their seemingly most important issue, that of claims against Turkey, can most definitely come to an agreement with Azerbaijan on these terms. After the border protocols and the handling of the March 2008 protests, the Armenian side simply cannot hide behind the supposed stronger-than-government domestic opposition and pretend that it has its hands tied on the issue of Karabakh. As evidence shows, Armenian government and President Sarkisian are ready, willing and able to come to an agreement on important issues. If “genocide” can be part of concessions, then so can “Attach.”
Turkey, as the regional powerhouse, can play a very important role in this mediation, since it knows first-hand how Armenia negotiates, and makes concessions, on its most important issue, and since Turkey has now permanently inserted itself into the geopolitics of Caucasus by specifically engaging and
| < Prev | Next > |
|---|
