The US role in seemingly giving preference to Armenian-Turkish reconciliation over a solution to the Karabakh conflict has proved ineffective.
Vladimir Socor, an analyst at the
“Obama’s initiative could have generated positive dynamics throughout the region, with strategic gains for the United States, had it pursued the Turkish-Armenian normalization track in synchronization with the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict-resolution track,” Socor wrote in the article, published on the Jamestown Foundation web site. "By separating the two tracks, and privileging the first, the policy proved ineffective. The US and EU pressed for fast progress on Turkey-Armenia normalization, but failed to press for Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict-resolution in the ’Minsk Group’ or the bilateral format. In this situation, Turkey started backtracking soon after having signed the 10 October protocols. Some US administration officials with experience in the region did caution that progress was achievable if the two tracks were synchronized, rather than separated.
“For its part, Baku reached out to Turkey’s government, political parties, civil sector groups, and public opinion at large, with appeals to take Azerbaijan’s interests into account. This outreach effort was a first for Azerbaijan and it proved effective. It generated a strong current of opinion in the Turkish public and parliament, which would now make it difficult for the Turkish government to sacrifice or discount Azerbaijan’s interests, even if it decided to do so.”
“The Turkish government, however, has adjusted its course, as Erdogan’s Washington visit indicated. It remains for Baku to diversify its outreach to Turkey beyond Kemalist, nationalist, and moderate conservative groups, so as to encompass also the increasingly influential liberal opinion-making circles,” Socor concluded.
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