Interview of Nigar Göksel, ESI Senior Analyst, the European Stability Initiative (ESI).
Q: Don’t you think that from now on Baku will feel some kind distrust in relations with Ankara after the recent “diplomatic dispute” between Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenian issue?
A: It is true that there has been a souring in the relations but it is not only because of the Armenian issue. Both countries have naturally been changing in various ways and there may have been communication disconnects along the way. In the 90s, a vision to link Azerbaijan to the transatlantic world in as many ways as possible was shared widely and was the overarching priority.
Today the picture is more complex. Turkey has more of its own ambitions, is developing stronger partnerships with countries that do not share its transatlantic vocation, and in a sense is more “adventurous.”
A culmination of the perception in Baku that Turkey’s priorities were being reshuffled may have caused the eruption over the Armenian issue to be as strong as it was.
However, to remedy this sense of distrust in Baku, the Turkish decision makers have gone out of their way to emphasize the crucial importance of a just solution to the Karabakh conflict. We witnessed this most recently during the Turkish Prime Minister’s meeting with President Obama.
Will, despite this effort on Turkey’s part, the distrust continue? At some level, yes. Theoretically, the relationship should be back on track. But the human dimension should not be neglected. A tinge of bitterness and suspicion seems likely to remain, at least among the actors in the forefront of the recent tensions.
Q: How strong is Turkey to overcome the pressure from the West in “genocide” and “border” issues?
A: We hear from Washington that if Turkey normalizes relations with Armenia (which would include opening the border), this would make it more likely that the word genocide would not be pronounced from Washington (Congress and/or President) in April this year. This is how the two issues are linked.
However, many key figures in Ankara seem confident that a genocide resolution in Washington will not be passed this year in any case. It is assumed, based on a strategic calculation, that the US would not risk the blow a genocide resolution would have on the Turkey-US relationship. Turkey is playing a critical role in issues high on the agenda of the West. It is by now a widely shared perception that the positions Turkey takes regarding Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or the “Arab street,” can effect the course of events.
Members of the US Congress are neither historians nor legal experts — just like members of the Russian Duma in 1995 were not when they recognized the events of 1915 as genocide. Which brings me to the fact that up to 20 countries have done so. I would hope — for the sake of both Turkish citizens and Turkey’s influence on global affairs- that even if the US Congress were to one day pass a genocide resolution, the Turkish leadership would not allow this to change the entire course of the country’s foreign policy.
Q: Turkey is one of the members of OSCE Minsk group. Are there possibilities to involve Turkey in the Karabakh settlement as a fourth co-chair (with U.S., Russia and France)?
A: Armenia would object to Turkey joining the group of co-chairs, as Turkey is seen as favoring Azerbaijan. Realistically, it would not be possible with the current realities.
Of course I do not know whether Turkey could be accepted as a co-chair in return for normalizing relations with Armenia (establishing diplomatic relations and opening borders). Even if so, it is debatable that Turkey would have more influence on the process as a co-chair than it does by leveraging the border option.
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