HistoryofTruth.com - Armenian Allegations

Interview of Stepan Grigoryan, head of the Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation.

Q: What can you say about the statement by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made during the meeting with the US president that Ankara will normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations only after the real progress in Karabakh settlement?

A: This is a well-known position of the Turkish side that has experienced many changes in the past year. A year ago Turkey demanded withdrawal of the Armenian armed formations from the five regions around Nagorno Karabakh, while now it is just looking forward the progress in the negotiation process within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. I think this dynamics in Turkey’s position is dictated with the logics of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue (establishment of relations without preliminary provisions), new accents in Turkey’s external policy of the recent 5-6 years and the realities produced by Russia’s August war against Georgia in 2008. Indeed, the Turkish foreign policy has experienced significant changes in the past years. Turkey recognized Russia’s and Iran’s interests in the South Caucasus, agreed on Russia’s construction of the South Stream gas pipeline, initiated dialogue with Syria, signed serious contracts on gas projects with Iran, recognized Kosovo’s independence and sent its deputy foreign minister to Abkhazia. Earlier in 2003 the Turkish parliament did not allow US land offensive against Saddam Husein’s regime from Turkey’s territory. In fact, Turkey has passed to the new external policy rejecting the formula “everything that is good for the United States in Middle East, South Caucasus and Central Asia is good for Turkey”.

But, as you understand, when you play you have to pay. After this process, the attitude of Turkey’s traditional partners to this country begins to change. Thus, Tel-Aviv and Washington are outraged with Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and Syria which in fact makes the recognition of “Armenian genocide” a technical task. Therefore, the Turkish Premier was told during the visit to the United States that if the Armenian-Turkish protocols are not ratified by April 2010, Barack Obama’s administration will not be able to prevent recognition of the “Armenian genocide” committed in the Osman Empire in 1915 by the US Congress. As is seen, this will be “double recognition”. On 24 April 2010 the US president will make the due statement and a little later the “Armenian genocide” will be recognized by the House of Representatives of the US Congress.

We can continue this list of implications for Turkey. For example, one can ask how Turkey can change its attitude to national and religious minorities both inside the country and beyond its bounds (we have already paid attention to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Turkey and open support to Abkhazs. Turkey has changed its attitude to Kurdish language, opened radio programs in Armenian inside the country) and not occupy a more impartial position in the Karabakh issue.

It would have been more effective if Turkey and Armenia ratify protocols without preliminary provisions and settle all the accumulated issues through a bilateral dialogue and not “act” via the third countries and for the interests of the third countries. I would also like to draw your attention to another aspect of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue: I think the opening of borders and normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the nearest future will lead to Armenia’s reorientation to the West and create conditions for the trilateral South Caucasus regional cooperation. The settlement of regional conflicts when the role of borders will significantly change and the compromised resolution of these conflicts becomes possible is seen in terms of the parallel European and Euroatlantic integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Therefore, the interests of Georgia and Azerbaijan are also implied in the process of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.

Q: Do you think the parliaments of both countries will ratify protocols on normalizing the Turkish-Armenian ties in such a situation?

A: I think the Turkish and Armenian parliaments will ratify the protocols. Thus, the progovernmental coalition consisting of three parties in the National Assembly of Armenia controls about 75% of deputies mandates which facilitates the ratification of protocols. The situation in the Turkish parliament is more complicated but I am confident that the Turkish parliament will ratify both protocols in the coming 2-3 months. The thing is that Turkey is a country with big state traditions and its political elite adheres to national interests in taking important decisions.

Today Turkey is interested in normalizing relations with Armenia for most including the aforementioned reasons. Moreover, normalization of Turkey’s relations with Armenia fully complies with its new external policy. Thus, it cannot take into account the interests of Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, assist to Abkhazia and at the same time keep borders with Armenia closed. Moreover, Turkey knows that not only the United States and EU but also Russia are interested in the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. All these factors will finally lead to ratification of protocols by the Turkish parliament.

Q: By results of the Munich meeting the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs declared some breakthrough in the negotiation process. What do you think is the script of the further development of the Karabakh issue?

A: The Karabakh conflict settlement depends on most factors, both internal and external ones. As far as I understand, the negotiation process has recently intensified and it should be welcomed. Yet it is difficult to count on the quick settlement of the conflict at least for the reason of high distrust existing in the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies towards each other, absence of culture of compromise of the elites of the two countries and the high level of intolerant attitude towards each other. Therefore, I am against the artificial acceleration of the Karabakh conflict settlement as it may raise possibility of hostilities.

Q: Are Moscow and Washington really interested in the complete settlement of the Karabakh conflict?

A: It seems that Russia and the United States have a consensus in this issue: both countries are unready and do not consider the quick settlement of the Karabakh conflict possible. The difference here lies in motivation of the sides. Thus, Russia is not interested in the quick settlement of the problem as it understands that it might lose the last “lever” of influence on Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the United States do not see objective grounds for the quick settlement of the conflict at least for the reason of a serious discrepancy in the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan on basic issues (withdrawal of troops from the lands around Nagorno Karabakh, problem of Nagorno Karabakh’s status, terms and order of refugees’ return and so on).

Q: Will the Karabakh conflict be settled next year?

A: Despite serious discrepancies in the positions of the sides, I do not exclude possible signing of a certain framework agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the coming months. The agreement may be based on the renewed Madrid principles that contain all elements (principle of territorial integrity, rights of nations for self-determination and peace settlement of the conflict) concerning all parties. Yet, it would be difficult to attain the signing of a comprehensive peace treaty as the parties still have significant discrepancies on a number of principal issues and on the order of implementation of agreements.

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