The uses to which this leverage can be put are another matter. Russia’s goals in the region seem to be limited to 1) neutralizing Georgia, 2) reducing US/NATO influence and 3) maintaining/increasing its control over energy transit from the region to Europe.
The 2008 war with Georgia allowed it to more or less achieve goals 1 and 2. Goal 3 is proving more difficult, not so much because of Nabucco and BTC, but because of the increasing role being played in the larger region by China, which is constructing pipelines that will reduce Russian control over Caspian energy transit even if they don’t reach Azerbaijan itself.
Q: In your opinion, to what extent is Russia interested in peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What kind of interests does Russia pursue in this?
A: I’m afraid I have not been following this topic closely in recent years and cannot answer this question with much confidence.
Q: What do you think about the current geopolitical role of Turkey in the South Caucasus and this country’s interests in the region?
A: In previous years, Turkey saw itself as a close ally of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. This was part of its effort to be the leader of the international Turkic community. More recently, Turkey has been trying to play more a more even-handed role, including its recent opening to Armenia. I see this as a positive development. I don’t think there is any chance of settling the NK dispute as long as Armenia feels isolated – they will refuse any settlement and maintain their fortress mentality. But as relations develop with Turkey, it may turn out that Armenia comes to feel less encircled, and therefore more secure. This may lead to a greater willingness to compromise. A second factor for Turkey is that its elites have come to realize that they share many interests in common with Russia, especially in the Black Sea . This has led to closer relations between these two countries, as they work on trying to limit the influence of outsiders in the region.
Q: Is there any possibility of breaking out the military operation between Azerbaijan and Armenia again? If it happens, what countries could be drawn in the war, taking into consideration the presence of Russian military base in Armenia, on the one hand, and the strong strategic relationships between Azerbaijan and Turkey, on the other hand?
A: Again, I haven’t followed the specifics of the NK conflict very closely. At the same time, it seems to me that the situation is inherently unstable. Azerbaijan is gradually becoming stronger vis-à-vis Armenia. For this reason, I expect that any future conflict would have to be started by the Azerbaijani side.
Armenia has everything it wants and has no reason to start a war it might well lose. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, could well retake some or all of the occupied territories, but runs two very serious risks: 1) the possibility of Russian intervention to help Armenia, which would make Azeri victory virtually impossible and 2) the loss of Western political and financial support if it is seen as the aggressor in such a conflict, which would have a severe impact on the country’s economy.
These two factors, I would guess, limit the willingness of Azeri elites to launch a war. (Turkey, I would venture, would not intervene in this conflict unless it is obvious to everyone that the war is started by Armenia.)
News.Az
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