On Jan. 12, the Constitutional Court of Armenia recognized the Turkey-Armenia protocols to establish diplomatic relations and develop bilateral relations to be in conformity with Armenian legislation. To make the protocols law, both Turkey and Armenia need to put them to a vote in their respective parliaments.
All eyes are now on Turkey, where the protocols are currently being reviewed in Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, but there is little sign that they will leave those chambers.
While the Armenian leadership is now one step closer to parliamentary approval, Turkey’s leadership still needs to decide if it is really committed to the implementation of the protocols and Turkey-Armenia reconciliation. Doubts have been steadily growing about Ankara’s willingness to abide by the commitments it made in August and October to establish diplomatic relations, open its long-closed border and establish bilateral commissions, including one on the historical dimension.
According to Turkey, this is because Armenia has not made sufficient concessions to resolve the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. Yet the linkage between Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is not part of the protocols.
It is not in the official texts, even though the Turkish leadership has, since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan traveled to Baku in May, publicly reverted to its traditional position, demanding Armenia withdraw from some of the 13 percent of Azerbaijan territory it occupies before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. This insistence has grown, as Azerbaijan has threatened to downgrade its relationship with Turkey if the border is opened before the Karabakh conflict is resolved. Azerbaijan already turned to Russia to sign a deal to supply natural gas starting this month, while cheap Azerbaijani gas is worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the Turkish Treasury and is needed if the European Union-supported Nabucco pipeline is ever to be built. On the other hand, Turkey genuinely hoped that by moving forward with the protocols, it could encourage the United States, the EU and Russia to increase their efforts to resolve the long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the context of ongoing talks mediated by the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
In 2009 there were indeed more high-level meetings on Karabakh than ever before, but it is highly unlikely that Turkey can take the credit. Whether Ankara can have any influence on Baku, to encourage it to accept an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh that could eventually lead to full self-determination and independence, is also unlikely. But Erdoðan is most likely going to call for Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in mediation during his current visit to Moscow. The Turkish government believes that it is now Russia’s turn to pressure Armenia into compromises and the start of a withdrawal from occupied territories.
Higher-level Russian involvement is positive. But even if Moscow does encourage Yerevan to make more compromises, as it may when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visits Armenia this week, this is unlikely to be enough to secure agreement on the comprehensive Document on Basic Principles being promoted for years by the OSCE. In November 2008, when Russia put pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan to sign an agreement, with the direct personal involvement of President Dmitry Medvedev, the best they could muster was the four-point Moscow Declaration. This document, which committed the two sides to seek a political settlement and non-use of force, has actually done nothing to improve the situation on the ground, and cease-fire violations have continued to increase. Turkish officials also put much hope in facilitating conflict resolution through their own Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform, whose first high-level meeting is expected in the next couple of months. But at this point, it is unclear why a new international forum will succeed where the OSCE has failed for the past 15 years. Ultimately, for there to be a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is the leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with their respective societies, who need to accept a compromise, which would be difficult but highly beneficial to both. Finally, Turkish officials also claim that public opinion in the country is demanding Armenian withdrawal before border opening.
This, in a country where the public is riveted by internal political crises, where one poll showed more than two-thirds of the population supported President Abdullah Gül’s initial visit to Yerevan and where the government is making progress on much more controversial domestic reforms, is a dubious justification for inaction and lack of leadership on the question. With 337 of the 550 seats in Parliament, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) can almost guarantee the protocols’ passage. So can the ruling party in Armenia. If President Serzh Sarksyan plays his cards right — and there are anti-Turkish forces in Armenia that could derail the process there, too — he will ensure that his Parliament passes the protocols several weeks before April 24, commemorated as Armenian genocide day by many around the world.
Even without any concessions to the outside world on Nagorno-Karabakh, it will look as though Armenia honored its side of the deal while Turkey did not. By insisting on linking Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the resolution of the Azerbaijani-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara is doing little to make progress on either fronts.
Luckily it is not too late to act, and Turkey still has several weeks until
SABINE FREIZER / Today’s Zaman
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