History of Truth - Armenian Allegations

Questions about the future of the Armenian initiative, which began with soccer diplomacy, have increased. As if linking the protocols to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and the lack of a development in the Baku-Yerevan line was not enough, now the Armenian Constitutional Court has issued a ruling on the legality of the protocols. There are also talks about giving the Armenian president the authority to revoke his signature from the protocols.

But Armenia has actually strengthened Turkey's hand, which will not ratify the protocols until some progress is made in the Karabakh problem. It is for this reason that according to some people, Turkey's rejection of the ruling is just an “excuse.” But it's a shame for the historic opportunity that has been seized.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry denies claims that it is using excuses and believes implementing the protocols would benefit both sides. So how is that going to happen? According to the ministry, the court's reference to Article 11 of Armenia's Declaration of Independence, which refers to Turkey's East as Western Armenia, and the Armenian Constitution's preamble, which explains that it is the Armenian government's mission to get international recognition of the Armenian genocide, has impaired the protocols. If the government's authority to debate whether genocide happened is revoked, what will the history commission discuss? If Turkey's borders are not recognized, how will relations normalize? According to the Foreign Ministry, the verdict is also against international law. According to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a party cannot claim its internal law as an excuse not to implement a treaty. It is for this reason that Ankara wants a written statement guaranteeing that the protocols are valid. To this end, Ankara has been talking with the US and mediator Switzerland. However, initial reactions aren't hopeful in accelerating the process to find a solution to Karabakh or in providing a written guarantee. Not only are Turkey's concerns not being shared, but establishing a connection between the protocols and the Karabakh problems is being rejected. But the reason the Armenian border crossing was closed was not because of problems between Ankara and Yerevan but because Armenia occupied one-fifth of Azerbaijan. Therefore, even if the protocols do not mention it, the link between the border crossing and the occupation is evident.
With this fact out in the open, diplomats consider Turkey's justification to ratify the protocols as “giving momentum to a solution.” The fact that the leaders of both countries have met nine times since the process started is affirmation of this thesis. The Karabakh issue, which had been thrown in the freezer and handled by low level officials, is finally being addressed by state leaders and foreign affairs ministers. However, it is odd that the US and Russia take the Karabakh issue lightly even though the connection between Karabakh and normalization between Yerevan and Ankara is evident. It's almost as if they expect Turkey to risk losing Azerbaijan for the sake of normalizing relations with Armenia while occupation continues. Indeed, the complexity of the Karabakh problem and the error in linking normalization to a solution is clear. However, what Turkey wants is not necessarily a full solution to the problem but some well-intentioned steps to be taken.
Actually, the parameters for a solution to a problem that has been a subject of debate for many years have emerged. What's missing is the will of major states and their attitude that favors Armenia. Finding a solution is predicated on four points: The first point is Armenia's withdrawal from the five places it occupies. There is a full consensus over this. The second point is Armenia's withdrawal from Kelbecer. There is consensus over withdrawal; however, the timetable is under dispute. The third point is the width and status of the Laçin corridor. The options over this issue are clear; however, negotiations are still under way. The fourth point is the status of Karabakh. There are two problems with this, one is whether the status will be temporary or permanent and the other is how it will be determined.
Azerbaijan is in favor of a temporary status while Armenia insists on a permanent status. As for the method, Armenia, which is confident about its population balance in Karabakh, wants a referendum while Azerbaijan maintains that its constitution prohibits holding a referendum only in one part of the country. It is for this reason that peculiar solutions are being sought between the two positions.
The key point of the process, which will relieve both Turkey and the South Caucasus, lies with how the principles will be put into force. While Armenia is reluctant to take any steps until an agreement is reached over the package as a whole, Azerbaijan believes the process of finding an agreement can start with Armenia's withdrawal from the five regions. Baku says it will open the border crossing if Armenia ends its occupation. If this step is taken, Turkey will ratify the protocols and also open its border crossing. From this perspective, Armenia holds the key to free itself from isolation and increasing misery. What's requested of Armenia is not a lot but just withdrawal from a portion of the territories that it occupies.
But even if Armenia comprehended this reality, would forces that don't want a solution want it to take this step?

Abdulhamit Bilici/Today's Zaman

< Prev		Next >