It was April 22, when an Armenian-Turkish-Swiss trilateral joint statement (already agreed upon on April 2) was published, underscoring the commitment by the ruling elites of two nations to normalization of relations by addressing core issues of misunderstanding.
Despite the growing pessimism for the rapprochement, initialed protocols were published Sept. 1. When even more pessimism loomed over the process and a dramatic breakdown appeared close, the two documents were signed in Zurich on Oct. 10, with mediation from the United States. The protocols have since been sent to parliaments for ratification. In Armenia they also went through the Constitutional Court, which issued a legal blessing Jan. 12.
It would seem that all it would take is political will to take the last step in legislatures. But having gone all this way, the sides are now thinking about exit strategies.
The Armenian-Turkish process has been driven by a series of “midnight” decisions. I assume the strategy below will be valid and thus utilized if nothing that extraordinary happens, such as a small-scale military-political crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh till April 24 this year.
Since the Constitutional Court ruling, Turkey together with her minor ally Azerbaijan appear to be diplomatically isolated. Turkish efforts to link the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement with the normalization issue have not been successful. Armenian officials say that while they recognize the linkage between those two issues, they should be mutually reinforcing rather than conditioning one another.
In this light, the only counter-argument Turkey can raise in order to force the United States to back its position is Turkey’s alleged indispensability as NATO ally in the Middle East. (On the flip side, few remember that the Turkish economy is dependent upon the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for the country’s government to commit any real anti-American moves.)
Since the beginning of the process, parties have been changing their rhetoric quite often. The Turkish side has been harsh by default, but their deeds not always reflect the actual steps, in a positive sense.
On the contrary, Armenian president Serge Sarkisian’s rhetoric has gone from positive and optimistic in the beginning, to “if we don’t try we don’t win”-like justifications more recently. President Sarkisian’s initiative to amend the legal background for recalling the signature under the protocols was thought to prepare the exit strategy.
Draft amendments to Armenia’s Law on International Treaties now have been put on the agenda of the Parliament. A new (draft) Article 38.1 will entitle the president to recall or suspend the signature under the international treaty practically at any stage of contracting or ratification.
Nearly simultaneously with the amendments on rescission, the protocols were also submitted for ratification. Being so far at the front doors, they can remain pending for 10 years or more. Technically, as far as both president Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hold constitutional majorities in the parliaments, the ratification process initially was thought to be functional. But as Erdoğan once put it, he could not guarantee a successful vote, because it would be a secret ballot, thus winning an excuse for possible failure. In response, the Armenian president once more reminded the audience at Chatham House about holding the majority legislative seats and personally guaranteeing a successful vote if Turkey agreed to go on the first. Later on some new statements from MPs came into light, suggesting proceeding with ratification before Turkey, which showed certain disconnections in the ruling elite in Yerevan.
But if it does come to ratification, will the protocols be ratified together, or one-by-one?
When I put this question to Vigen Sarkisian, the Armenian president’s foreign policy aide who recently spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, he argued it was not feasible to proceed with the one protocol in the absence of another, because they are interlinked and that will harm the essence and substance of the agreements, making it impossible to make progress.
All the same, that does not necessarily mean that the protocols could not be considered separately.
In fact, to this day it has not been explained why there are in fact two protocols instead of one, single, integrated document about the whole complex of issues.
The protocol on diplomatic relations speaks about exchanging diplomatic missions and just “the decision to open the common border,” which has no time limits to be done and is not formulated in a legally binding manner.
All the sub-commissions and the border opening with specific timeframes are embodied in the second protocol on development of relations.
It may well be that the recent Turkish criticism of the Armenian Constitutional Court’s decision on Jan. 12, charging Armenia with undermining the spirit of the protocols may be followed by Ankara deciding to ratify only one of the two protocols.
International law, more specifically the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), foresees no mechanisms (unless mentioned in the actual texts of treaties) regarding ratification of the signed agreements in a timely manner, except for the good faith and political goodwill of the states. And the protocols themselves do not set out any order for ratification.
The second protocol says that both documents “shall enter into force on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month following the exchanges of instruments of ratification.” Armenia’s Constitutional Court added its interpretation that “either protocol cannot acquire legal force or take effect without the other.”
Nevertheless, theoretically they can be ratified one-by-one, whenever the parties have enough political will for each, and only then they can enter into force.
Certainly, the Armenian side’s main interest is to have the border with Turkey open rather than to establish yet another diplomatic mission. (Even without diplomatic relations, an Armenian diplomat has been working in Istanbul via the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.)
But the Armenian side might agree to separation of protocols and thus preservation of the normalization process should Turkey offer firm guarantees about a reasonable timeframe for border opening, perhaps before the end of the first term of the Sarkisian presidency in February 2013.
Thus, theoretically, 2012 could become the year when the normalization process is finally completed.
Alternatively, should Turkey fail to ratify the protocols, Armenia might rescind the protocols, postponing ratification until after the Turkish general elections due in 2011, and possibly also after the next Armenian presidential elections in 2013.
*The author, Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a visiting fellow at Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Hurriyetdailynews
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