History of Truth - Armenian Allegations

Last week the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly voted in favor of recognizing the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Ever since, the Turkish media has been full of speculations on what might happen if the full House would support such a resolution, which would make it extremely difficult for the American president not to give in to the central demand: to use the G-word in his annual speech on April 24.

How should Turkey react? What would it mean for relations between Turkey and the U.S.? What would be the fall-out for the already stalling process of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia?

The interesting thing is that in the international media, most observers tend to believe a senior Obama administration official who said, speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press, “There was an understanding with the Democratic leadership in Congress that the resolution would not go to a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives.” The Washington Post, well connected on Capitol Hill, came to the same conclusion. But I am afraid these sobering thoughts will not have a big impact in Turkey.

I wish they had. What will probably happen is that in the next six weeks, until April 24, most pundits will be engaged in making up all kind of scenarios based on “What if …?” And although foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said Turkey is determined to press ahead with efforts to normalize ties with Armenia, the net result of all these hypothetical exercises will be that nothing positive will happen in relations between Turkey and Armenia.

The protocols, signed by both governments, will not be approved by the Turkish Parliament because the American resolution is the perfect excuse to stop the ratification process. It comes on top of a decision by the Armenian Constitutional Court some weeks ago to which many in Turkey overreacted. According to most foreign specialists, the ruling itself does not pose an obstacle for ratification but both government and opposition politicians were quite happy to make it into one.

One would almost lose sight of the real reasons why the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, does not want to use its majority in Parliament to sanction the deal made by its own ministers. It’s very simple: it is because Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself has repeatedly linked ratification to progress in finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

When Davutoğlu signed the protocols in late autumn he sounded very confident that ratification would follow in the spring of this year. I always thought that was because the foreign minister had received some kind of guarantee from his American, French and, most importantly, Russian colleagues present at the ceremony that this spring, Armenia, pushed by these three countries, would move some of its troops out of some occupied Azeri territories. In that scenario, Turkey would get the best of both worlds: improved relations with Armenia and something to show to the Azerbaijanis.

Until now Armenia has not moved one soldier. That could mean three things: 1) I was wrong, there was no guarantee, in which case Davutoğlu was far too optimistic; 2) There was a deal but the Armenians could not be pressured to give in; or 3) There was an agreement between the big powers but the Russians are not willing to deliver.

Anyway, the result of these misjudgements could well be that Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan all remain stuck in frozen conflicts. To prevent such a disaster, after hopes were raised so high, the ruling party should be clever enough to keep sight of the bigger picture, rise above petty political squabbles in Washington and Ankara and have the courage to ratify the agreements with Armenia.

Better to have an open border than a closed mind.

Joost Lagendijk/Hurriyet Daily News

< Prev		Next >