Yerevan’s unilateral decision, as Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu describes it, to put the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement on hold should have had a cold shower effect on those who had long been fed up with the overcooked so-called Armenian genocide debate.
On April 22, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan signed a decree suspending the ratification of the “Protocol on Establishing Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Opening the Border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.”
In his televised address to his fellow Armenians, Sarksyan said, “Our political objective for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey remains valid, and we shall consider moving forward when we are convinced that there is the proper environment in Turkey and the leadership in Ankara is ready to reengage in the normalization process.” Referring to Ankara’s demand for Armenia to end its occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan before Parliament ratifies the protocols, the Armenian president charged Ankara with causing the breakup in the normalization process by making the end of Armenian occupation a precondition to the ratification.
While Ankara repeatedly reiterated its wish to continue the normalization of relations with Yerevan, on April 24 Armenian demonstrators burned Turkish flags as well as posters of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu during the so-called Armenian genocide commemoration ceremonies attended by President Sarksyan and other Armenian officials.
Like the Armenian officials, some inside and outside Turkey have criticized Ankara for pushing the end of Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition to the ratification of the protocols. Some even argued that there was no relationship between the occupation and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and that Azerbaijan stood as an obstacle to normalization.
As a matter of fact, the real obstacle to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Armenia’s irredentist attitude toward its neighbors. As such, Armenia’s irredentism not only constitutes a national security threat to Turkey, but also is the major obstacle to any step toward sustainable security and stability in the South Caucasus. So long as Yerevan does not irreversibly change this attitude, it is unlikely to achieve any sustainable relationship between Turkey and Armenia.
Armenia is an irredentist country. That is, it is a country with aspirations on a part of another country’s land, over which it claims to have the political right to control. Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence reads, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia,” referring to contemporary eastern Turkey as Western Armenia. Article 12 reads, “This declaration serves as the basis for the development of the constitution of the Republic of Armenia and, until such time as the new constitution is approved, as the basis for the introduction of amendments to the current constitution; and for the operation of state authorities and the development of new legislation for the republic.” So obviously, the crux of the Armenian Constitution and of the guideline for the state authorities is Yerevan’s unrelenting aspirations to seize eastern Turkey as well as other possible monetary and political reparations.
Yerevan has proven its characteristic as such by invading and occupying 20 percent of a neighboring country -- Azerbaijan. Consequently, another neighboring country, Turkey, which has long been the main target of Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations, closed its common border with Armenia. Although Turkey and Azerbaijan do have deep cultural, ethnic, social, economic and political ties and as such Turkey’s closure of the border may seem and has long been portrayed as an emotional response to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijan’s territories, Turkey’s response to the invasion is purely a rational one.
It is only normal for a country to seal its common border with an irredentist neighbor to maintain its national security and territorial integrity.
It is more so given that Armenia has never officially recognized and acknowledged its common border with Turkey, constitutionally considers part of Turkey’s lands as its own and worse, has for almost two decades been occupying 20 percent of another neighboring country. So, the reason Turkey shut its border with Armenia and why Turkey should keep it as such is not simply Turkey’s affinity with Azerbaijan, but Armenia’s irredentist nature and the security threat that it clearly poses to its neighbors. The fact that Armenia cannot dare to confront Turkey militarily neither ceases its aspirations on Turkish territories nor changes its malignant nature that has long obstructed progress toward security and stability in the South Caucasus.
Moreover, the impunity Armenia has long enjoyed despite its continuous violations of international law, humanitarian law, Geneva conventions and United Nations Security Council resolutions during and after its invasion of Azerbaijani territory makes Yerevan even more reckless about paralyzing its peace talks with Turkey and Azerbaijan. On April 30, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/822 (1993), “noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, Expressing grave concern at the displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, [and demanding] the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.” This resolution came after Yerevan-backed local Armenian forces killed 613 Azerbaijani civilians, including 106 women and 83 children, in the town of Khojali on Feb. 25-26, 1992. Instead of ceasing their attacks, the Armenian forces expanded their killing campaign to beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region into surrounding districts such as Lachin, Kubatly, Jebrail, Zangelan, Aghdam and Fizuli. As Armenian forces continued to invade these districts, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 853, 874 and 884 in the same year demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories.
To this day, however, these districts, totaling 8.9 percent of Azerbaijani territory, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain under the control of Armenia. The way Sarksyan recalls the Khojali massacres is quite telling: “We don’t speak loudly about these things. But I think the main point is something different. … Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that is what happened.” (Thomas de Waal, “Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,” NYU Press 2004, p.172) By that, President Sarksyan also implies what they aspire to do so long as the circumstances permit.
The way forward
In the final analysis, the current leadership in Yerevan does not seem to be ready to acknowledge its past transgressions, let alone make due reparations to their victims. Yet it can start by revisiting Armenia’s irredentist characteristic and finding ways to get rid of it instead of asking Ankara to give up its precondition to the ratification of the protocols.
In the meantime, Ankara should recognize that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is directly contingent to not one but two preconditions: First, Armenia must end its occupation of the Azerbaijani territories in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as the surrounding districts, and second, it must remove from its constitution the articles that describe eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” In the absence of the other, satisfying one of these conditions is not enough, because while one literally certifies Yerevan’s irredentist aspirations toward Turkey, the other practically illustrates that Yerevan would seek to fulfill those aspirations once the circumstances permit. Until then, Turkey’s common border with Armenia should remain sealed.
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst
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