If in the 1990s someone was to suggest that Turkish-Russian relations could one day reach a level of strategic partnership it would have likely induced uproarious laughter to listeners. Psychological constraints revolving around misperceptions were a kind of Sword of Damocles in bilateral relations while the persistent lack of understanding, prevalent among the ruling elite on both sides, was the main source of mutual mistrust.
This problem was more acute among the Russian decision makers. In the post-Soviet period, the anti-Turkey lobby in Russia consisted mainly of security elites and, to a lesser extent, communist and ultra-nationalist deputies of the Duma who considered Turkey a proxy of Russia’s arch-military adversaries, namely the U.S. and NATO. Due to ambitions they advanced with regard to the Russian sphere of influence, or the so-called “near abroad,” their perception of Turkey appeared to have been that of a rival and traditional enemy.
As an expert on ex-Soviet geography, however, I always believed that, in time, the unique geopolitics of both countries, having left profound marks on their historical progress and bilateral relations alike, would inevitably force them to adopt a more constructive attitude. I was certain that they would eventually realize their interests overlap rather than clash. Time has proven me right.
The primary drive behind this astonishing process has come from Russia itself. The current Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, since coming to power in 2000, has prioritized economic interests in his foreign policy conduct while geopolitical ambitions have been replaced by geo-economical aspirations. Trying to make the most of Russia’s few assets, Putin has increasingly relied on the export of energy resources. Under his leadership, the creation of an energy dependence on Russia among its neighbors in particular has become Moscow’s primary foreign policy goal. The reason Turkey has been elevated to the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda is closely related to Putin’s strategic expectations in that regard.
In the meantime, Turkey was also undergoing a change in its foreign policy understanding, the main motto of which was “A Turkish world from the Adriatic to China.” Having first been uttered in a speech made by Henry Kissinger in a session of the World Economic Forum held in Istanbul in 1992, this idea dominated the Turkish understanding of the nation's foreign policy drive toward ex-Soviet geography in the post-communist period. However, it was the late İsmail Cem, the Turkish foreign minister between 1997 and 2002, who realized that it was this understanding which was raising Russian hackles. According to Cem, Turkey’s foreign policy could be best described as being bereft of a historical dimension. He argued it lacked depth with respect to time and breadth with respect to space. At this time, Turkey needed to set a new policy course that acknowledged the role of Russia as pivotal.
The Action Plan on Cooperation with Eurasia, signed in 2001, became the eventual manifestation of the political rapprochement between the two countries. As someone who contributed academically to it, I very clearly recall that Cem, first and foremost, wanted both sides to speak openly, no matter whether they agreed or disagreed. Thus, the calls for consultation, as well as confidence-building measures, which are envisaged in the agreement, have undeniably led to talks of a strategic partnership today.
The Justice and Development Party government, under the theoretical guidance of Ahmet Davutoğlu, has taken one step further. There is no doubt that at present, Ankara is paying special attention to the Russia factor in its foreign policy conduct. There are, nevertheless, expectations. With the earlier mentioned agreement, both capitals finally acknowledged bilateral cooperation in the vast Eurasian area as a basic prerequisite for regional stability. This is particularly valid for the Caucasus, where the main problem is the resolution of the Karabakh knot. It is in this regard that Moscow should approach Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan’s persistent calls for a regional Caucasian stability pact in a more concrete manner.
One of the basic issues to be discussed during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s official visit to Turkey will therefore be the Karabakh problem. Circles close to Erdoğan say that the prime minister, during his last visits to Russia, frankly highlighted Turkey’s expectations of the Russian government and there have been promising signs that these calls have not gone unheard. During my visit to Baku last February, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, for instance, described Russia’s stance as having become “more constructive than ever.” Apparently it was the Sochi meeting held between Medvedev, Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan that had increased his optimism.
In any strategic partnership, a common strategic vision is an essential prerequisite. What matters is whether respective parties are seeing the world, as well as the problems before them, through the same lenses. For the Turkish-Russian partnership the acid test will ultimately be the Karabakh issue.
C. Cem Oguz/Hurriyet Daily News
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