Interview with Yuliya Nikitina, PhD, Research Fellow, MGIMO Center for the Post-Soviet Studies.
Q: How would you comment on CSTO’s decision not to interfere with stability and security in Kyrgyzstan?
A: CSTO may interfere with the conflict only at the request of a member-state. In case of revolutions of Kyrgyzstan both in 2005 and 2010 the organization did not receive such a request, the temporary government has appealed for assistance to the organization only after riots in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. However, the organization reject to send the military contingent only limiting itself with the promise to send technical (aviation, transport) and humanitarian assistance. From the legal viewpoint, the CSTO decision not to send troops is absolutely right since CSTO is primarily the organization of collective security against external threats and it does not have to settle internal conflicts of its members
Currently, an operative working group developing proposals on possible measures of stabilization in Kyrgyzstan is functioning within CSTO. On June 25 representatives of this group flied to Kyrgyzstan to “develop additional proposals”. Before that, head of the State Service of National Security of Kyrgyzstan Keneshbek Dushebayev said the riots in the south could have been provoked by international extremist organizations. This interpretation of ethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan may create grounds for CSTO’s interference- if we consider the events of mid June as a provocation of extremists that intervened from the territory of Afghanistan or other neighbor states. However, it is highly unlikely that the heads of the CSTO member-states will agree on such interpretation.
Q: Does such attitude of CSTO to one of its members lead to the loss of its trust among the rest participants of the organization and its further collapse?
A: Undoubtedly, Kyrgyzstan is not satisfied with the CSTO decision not to intervene, but other members of the organization share in the opinion that they should not interfere. The CSTO declaration adopted a formulation about “nonconstitutional change of power” after the revolutionary events on Belarus proposals. It was supported by the rest members who fear “color” revolutions and coups in their countries and prefer not to create the precedent of CSTO interference with the domestic affairs since they want to have a carde blanche for the independent resolution of domestic riots.
Q: There is a view that CSTO passiveness in the Kyrgyz issue proves Moscow’s hand in the indicated events in this Middle Asian country. What can you say about it?
A: Indeed, there are rumors that Russia played an active role in the Kyrgyz revolution, however, they are groundless. CSTO’s passiveness can be explained by Russia’s unwillingness to interfere either in separate or within multipartite structures.
Q: The events in Kyrgyzstan have shown that there is still no unity of views among the CSTO members regarding when to use the prompt reaction forces. In which circumstances could these forces be used in the South Caucasus?
A: There had been only Collective Prompt Reaction Forces for Central Asia within CSTO that could not be used in the so-called Caucasus regime of CSTO collective security. However, the Collective Prompt Response Forces were created for all the three regions of collective security including Russia-Belarus, Russia-Armenia and Russia-Central Asia in 2009. However, it is important to realize that as stated by CSTO Secretary General N.Borduzha, “they are not planned to settle any interstate bilateral political problems either in the relations of our partners on CIS or neighbor states”. That is these forces in the South Caucasus may be used only for conduction of special operations in case of threat of terror, extremism, prevention of drug trafficking, protection of pipelines, elimination of consequences or disasters rather than for resolution of interstate conflicts.
Q: If, considering the absence of results in the diplomatic area, Azerbaijan risks to liberate its lands from Armenian occupation by force, will it be viewed by the CSTO leadership as an offensive against Armenia?
A: The decision on CSTO intervention must be taken by a consensus and provided that there is a request of the state that has been subjected to attack. In case of any hostilities launched by Azerbaijan Armenia will likely appeal to CSTO. But only the direct attack on Armenia, for example, the attack on its territory can be considered the attack against a CSTO member. Meanwhile, if the hostilities are directed against Karabakh, whose legal status is not defined, this will not be viewed by CSTO as a ground for interference.
Lala B.
News.Az
| < Prev | Next > |
|---|
