Interview with Lyndon Allin, a lawyer based in Washington, DC, specializing in the post-Soviet region.
Q: What are the main problems in the South Caucasus?
A: This is a very broad question. I suppose each of the three countries of the South Caucasus has its own particular problems, which differ substantially because the countries' economic and security situations are so different. Each of the secessionist regions also has its own particular problems. If I had to highlight one problem that unites the entire region, it would probably be the security risk posed and instability created by unrecognized states. These conflicts hinder the economic development of the region; they also sometimes seem to provide leaders in each of the region's countries with an excuse for not developing their political systems in a more democratic direction.
Q: There is a view that the Russian-Georgian war showed that no republic in the Russian neighbourhood could rely completely on US assistance on security. Do you agree?
A: I have not heard this opinion personally, probably because it is so obvious and uncontroversial (and should have been even before the 2008 war) as to not be worth stating. I don't think any responsible American official would ever have suggested that any former Soviet republic that is not a member of NATO could "rely completely" on US assistance in security issues. Some in the US have even called into question whether we should have made the commitments to the Baltics entailed by admitting them to NATO, although I think we would honour those commitments in the unlikely event that the need arose. Anyone in Georgia (or anywhere else in the CIS) who thought that they could "rely completely" on US military intervention in case of a direct conflict with Russia would have to have been misreading messages from Washington to get this impression.
Q: Can we expect the US to be more active in the Karabakh settlement, as Hillary Clinton promised during her visit to Baku and Yerevan?
A: I certainly hope and think so, although any solution will require not just the involvement of the US (and Russia, and to a lesser extent the EU) but more than anything will require courage and commitment on the part of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships to reach a settlement - they need not to be paralyzed by fear of the domestic political consequences. The US does realize that a renewal of armed conflict over Karabakh is not in anyone's interests, including the interests of the US, and therefore I think the US will continue to work as it has been doing to help facilitate discussions about a settlement. But it is important to emphasize that this has to be resolved by Armenia and Azerbaijan - although Russia and the US are fortunately cooperating with each other on this issue (and more broadly), the two larger powers are not going to be able to work this out without the participation and willingness to compromise of the countries which are parties to the conflict.
Q: Could a similar scenario to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war take place in Karabakh?
A: A scenario where heavy involvement of Russian military forces is part of the first phase of a renewal of hostilities does not seem possible under current conditions. For one thing, Russia does not have peacekeepers or civilians it claims as its citizens in Karabakh, which means that Russia lacks the justification it pointed to for its intervention in the case of South Ossetia. Such a scenario seems especially unlikely considering that Russian President Medvedev has recently put considerable public effort into a settlement of the conflict.
If the question refers more generally to an outbreak of hostilities and large-scale military action, I think a lot of people are working to prevent this but it is nevertheless possible that some cross-border incidents or provocations could escalate into a broader conflict. The concern of some in Washington is that the situation is fairly unstable along the line of contact, that there is not a sufficiently robust international monitoring presence there, and that there is a risk of minor cross-border gunfire (which does not seem to be uncommon) rapidly escalating into something much more serious.
Q: Do you expect progress in the Karabakh conflict anytime soon?
A: I don't know what to expect. I would be delighted to see any sort of progress, but I think the best we can realistically hope for is incremental progress toward an eventual settlement and a stable and peaceful situation along the line of contact, with efforts to avoid incidents like the one last month.
Q: Azerbaijan tries to defend its territorial integrity. Do you think that the Armenian secessionists have any chance of being declared an independent state?
A: The war in Georgia should have provided at least one important lesson to the Azerbaijani leadership - countries which try to "defend their territorial integrity" using force (or threats of force) against entrenched secessionists who have de facto control over the territory they claim risk seeing that policy backfire and lead to the cementing of secessionists' territorial positions. If Azerbaijan really wants to reverse the de facto loss of the territory controlled by the Karabakh secessionists, it will require a sustained diplomatic effort rather than a rapid military "solution" which would only create further problems. As a first step, Azerbaijan should embrace and promote confidence-building measures and increased civilian contacts between Azeris and Armenians in general and Karabakhis in particular.
I do not think there will be a final resolution where the "Nagorno-Karabakh republic" is recognized by anyone as an independent state. It doesn't seem out of the question that there may be a resolution under which some of the territory claimed by Azerbaijan and currently held by Armenia remains under the control of Armenia, or alternatively is nominally ruled from Baku but has substantial autonomy, but I think it will take a lot of negotiation to reach any final settlement that is acceptable to all parties.
Aliyah Fridman
News.Az
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