By Ilgar Mammadov
A new conversation about the Turkish-Armenian border is difficult to start, because the colors of the last year events have faded and the subject may seem boring to some. However, precisely now - at this hour of calm on the subject – must Azerbaijani leadership rethink what had happened then.
Baku continues to view the lock on that border as its own success, an outcome of its active and public diplomacy. Indeed, our leadership more than anyone else had publicly resisted the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement by tying it to the necessity of progress in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, even then I tended to think that Azerbaijan rumbles in vain, because all that noise originated from erroneous impressions prevailing within our leadership as a result of its too close relations with the Kremlin.
Since the very beginning, Baku overlooked the fundamental fact that Russia itself could not publicly oppose the rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan. On the other hand, Russians understood that the open border and growing political and economic presence of Turkey and NATO in Armenia would gradually push pro-Russian agenda out of that country, question the logic of Russian military presence there, and bring to power political figures that stand much beyond Moscow’s opportunities to influence them.
Therefore, the first task of Russian foreign policy was to persuade the Azerbaijani leadership that breakthrough was “near,” but it is endangered by the "the American initiative," that is by Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
To the credit of Russian politicians, they coped with the task exceptionally. In 2009, Azerbaijani leaders believed that after the war with Georgia, Russia was really interested in the rapid progress in the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, "because" she needed a ground connection to its ally - Armenia, "because" she wanted to establish itself as a great power that brought not only wars, but also peace to the South Caucasus, and so on. "If so," – it was reckoned in Baku - "we will come to terms with the Russians, and they will press on Armenia well enough. We shall not let those Turks knock out of our hands such a rare luck.”
For the experienced Russian diplomacy though, no brainwash in Baku was enough to guarantee the funeral of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. On January 12 this year, the Constitutional Court of Armenia, clearly under Russian dictation, issued a ruling which eviscerated the essence of the protocols signed by Davutoglu and Nalbandian last fall in Zurich. That was a so called Russian "control shot" – just in case Baku changes its mind.
When it became clear that the border has no chance of opening, Moscow began to concretize his opinions, surprising the Azerbaijani leadership by each new statement or action. First, Vladimir Putin expressed his opposition to linking the settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Turkish-Armenian dialogue. Then Georgia opened the land corridor connecting Russia to Armenia. Later on Georgian parliament – much to the pleasure of Gazprom – allowed “future” privatization of the main gas pipeline from Russia to Armenia. Finally, Medvedev insisted on a tripartite meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia in St. Petersburg – with sole purpose of removal of Yerevan from the awkward posture, in which she got stuck since last autumn, when Baku had accepted in general the ‘updated Madrid principles’, but Yerevan had refused. Now, after St. Petersburg, Armenian diplomacy is able to claim that some new initiatives were put forward by the co-chairs on the bank of the Neva river "to further advance the negotiating process." Neatly done Russian play.
The major shooting on the frontline right after the St. Petersburg meeting was probably an accident, but it fully matched the disappointed mood of Azerbaijani leadership, awakened after the skilful deception by its advisors - Medvedev, Putin and Lavrov. Under the same mood fell the US$200m loan to Belarus, in defiance of the Kremlin, but it was too late.
This entire historical cycle was closed by the three fundamental differences between the English original and the Russian translation of the Muscoca Declaration by Obama, Sarkozy and Medvedev. Russian translation, displayed on the official Kremlin website, has shown that even co-chairs of OSCE Minsk Group share no common approach to the resolution.
After all this cycle it would be the right option for the government of Azerbaijan to revise his view of the Turkish-Armenian dialogue. Since the breakthrough in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not as close as it might seemed last year in the light of Kremlin stars, then perhaps we should consider more seriously the strategy of Mr. Davutoglu.
** Ilgar Mammadov is an Azerbaijani politician and Co-Founder of “Republican: AL!” civic movement. He is known for his views that reflect knowledge and perceptions of the new generation of Azerbaijani public opinion leaders. Currently he sits on several international advisory boards including Revenue Watch Institute, and the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.
Azernews.az
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