Interview with Taleh Ziyadov, a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge (UK).
Q: Could you comment on the recent meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Astrakhan, mediated by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev?
A: This was yet another attempt to find ways to break the deadlock in the current peace process that is bound to collapse if a way out is not found. The OSCE Minsk Group has a revised proposal on the table that outlines a feasible plan to achieve long term peace in the South Caucasus. Mind you, this proposal was drafted taking into account the concerns and suggestions of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Baku declared that the proposal is not perfect but it could be used as a basis for drafting a final agreement on the so-called Basic Principles – which is to say, it agreed in principle. Yerevan, on the other hand, did not officially denounce the proposal (though a series of disapproving and contradictory statements have been circulated in the Armenian press), nor did it accept it. Instead, Yerevan started pointing to the more recent trilateral discussions between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia in St Petersburg in June. While the content of the St Petersburg meeting of the three presidents was not made public, it seems that the discussions among the parties were not limited to the OSCE Minsk Group proposal and may have gone beyond it. Azerbaijan interpreted this as an attempt by Armenia to disrupt the peace process and distract attention away from the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal, which Baku considers a workable option. Therefore, the following meetings facilitated by the Russian Federation, including the one in Astrakhan, should be viewed in the light of the odd St Petersburg meeting. I think the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal has the best framework that could lead to a workable agreement on Basic Principles. The focus should be placed on establishing common ground for a possible agreement.
Q: What do you think about the agreement on the immediate exchange of prisoners and human remains by Azerbaijan and Armenia? Will this agreement have a positive impact on the Karabakh peace process in general?
A: The exchange of prisoners and dead soldiers between Azerbaijan and Armenia is indeed a positive development. This is especially so, considering that there had been numerous attempts to do this exchange earlier. As you know, all the previous attempts, including the appeal from Russia’s Orthodox Patriarch Kirill I to repatriate the body of the dead Azeri soldier, Mubariz Ibrahimov, from Armenia, failed. Hence, this was an important tangible outcome of the trilateral meeting. But it is unfortunate that this exchange has been delayed for so long.
The “real outcome” for the Karabakh peace process, however, would be reaching an agreement on the OSCE Minsk Group proposal. If the initiative by President Medvedev helps reach this goal, it will be applauded. But whether this is the intention or a possible outcome of these trilateral meetings is yet to be seen. One thing is clear and that is that Moscow has an undeniable influence over Armenia and it’s probably the only regional power that could affect Yerevan's decisions.
Q: Considering the increased number of meetings between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan in recent months with the mediation of the Russian Federation, has Russia de facto “squeezed out” the other two OSCE Minsk Group mediators, namely the United States and France?
A: I wouldn’t characterize these efforts as “squeezing out” other players, though Moscow undoubtedly makes sure its interests are taken into account. Russia has always dominated the Karabakh peace process. In addition to multilateral and bilateral meetings, there have been a number of trilateral meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. The meeting in Astrakhan was the third in 2010 and the seventh since 2008. I don’t recall any trilateral meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and France or the United States during this time. Compared to active Washington in the early 1990s (when James Baker had worked out the so-called “Baker Rules”) and 2000 (when Colin Powell led the Key West talks), today the US is rather inactive and the Obama administration has no clear strategy towards the region. The same applies to Europe (i.e. the European Commission) whose involvement in the Karabakh peace process does not go beyond statements and reports. If Moscow is more active today, it does not mean it is holding the United States or France/the European Union back from doing the same. Rather, the Karabakh conflict is not a priority in Washington, Paris or Brussels. For Moscow, on the other hand, resolving the major conflict between two neighbours and states, which Russia considers its strategic partners in the South Caucasus, could be more important. After all, Moscow still perceives this matter as a regional "duty".
Moreover, the common belief that the status quo in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict serves Moscow is bound to fail. The South Caucasus region is a relatively small region and its further integration is only a matter of time. The integration of the economies of its neighbouring states will help this process and make the regional states more interdependent. Therefore, building strategies based on “freezing” conflicts is counterproductive and will not bring long-term peace to the region and may result in another war.
Q: How would you judge the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation? Are these efforts credible and do they have potential? Are these efforts in line with the national interests of Azerbaijan?
A: The mediation efforts are judged by their outcomes. While small results have been achieved in the negotiations, the more tangible and final outcome - the signing of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia - is yet to be attained. Hence, it would be premature to make a judgment on the credibility of the mediation efforts. As for the potential of Russia’s mediation efforts, this depends on how Moscow views its role as a mediator. In other words, if a mediator has leverage over the negotiating parties, but refuses to use this leverage in view of impartiality, this mediation effort is likely to be ineffective and a breakthrough should not be expected. Russian officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have made a number of statements in the past noting that the final decision on resolution of the Karabakh conflict should be left to the leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This means that Moscow has so far been unwilling to use its leverage to achieve a breakthrough, which Baku and Yerevan won’t reach on their own.
Carrots and inducements are an inseparable part of the mediation and negotiation process and it does not always run against the impartiality principle. It is no secret that Russia has significant influence in Armenia. Yerevan’s insecurity could be addressed by Moscow’s guarantees and other measures could be introduced to make sure that any signed peace deal will be sustainable and implemented by all parties. If extra effort is not made, the current process will be dead soon and the so-called Madrid principles will follow the fate of the 1997 Lisbon principles. The mediation efforts should focus on sealing a deal on the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal, as doing otherwise would nullify several years of work.
As far as Baku’s position in the negotiations is concerned, it is based on the principles of international law, and territorial integrity constitutes the key component of this framework. International mediators, including Russia, act within the framework of international law and their mediation efforts are guided by international law. Though bias among various mediating parties will always exist.
Q: What do you expect from the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the sidelines of the OSCE Summit in Astana in December?
A: This would most probably be another round of talks between the two heads of states. So no surprises there!
To make a serious breakthrough, the Karabakh peace process needs its own Camp David. The parties have agreed to most of the outstanding issues and require a final push. It’s extremely difficult to seal a comprehensive deal through sporadic meetings that take place once every two or three months. Realistically, what one should expect from the negotiations at the current stage is a possible agreement on a step-by-step “road map” to a final solution. This is feasible. For this reason, a dedicated high level peace accord should be organized (be it in Russia, Europe or the US) with the attendance of the two presidents and other influential global leaders. Such a retreat would show serious intent and create an opportunity for intensive and continuous mediated discussions between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan, reinforced by additional incentives from other leaders, which could hopefully break the deadlock.
Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge (UK). He specializes in energy security, transportation and geopolitical issues in Central Eurasia. His article analysing the phases of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until 2009 was published in the journal of International Negotiation (Volume 15, Number 1, 2010).
Aliyah Fridman
News.Az
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