WikiLeaks’ release of alleged confidential and secret US diplomatic cables will undoubtedly have a profound impact on relations between the United States and the rest of the world, and on international relations as a whole,
for many years to come. Needless to say, Turkey, like other countries in the region, was affected by the dump of allegedly classified documents, although opinions diverge about their impact – from unafraid and even welcoming this release of documents, such as by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (in his speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC on 29 November), to a cautious wait-and-see approach, and finally to downright very critical and negative (several high-ranking Turkish public officials and media).
One can remark that the fact that the US embassy in Ankara seems to have been the most productive in sending cables to Washington DC among all the US embassies in the world is a testament of Turkey’s importance and power on a world scale. The proof is in the pudding, as they say, and that proof has been crystal clear thanks to WikiLeaks.
Perhaps the only country in the region which has been relatively unscathed by the WikiLeaks revelations (at least so far) is Azerbaijan - thanks to a fairly transparent and balanced foreign policy, where US diplomatic cables have basically confirmed what every pundit knew all along anyway. While not really contributing radically to the knowledge about the country and its policies – unlike the case with Armenia, which has been rocked by the revelations about illegal arms supplies to Iran and Iraq, which resulted in at least one US military death and three more American soldiers wounded – the leaks about Azerbaijan and Turkey are filled with slang verbiage and imprecise usage of terminology, sometimes using colourful language, more resembling journalistic accounts than the fact-filled diplomatic dispatches they are supposed to be. Indeed, as one Western journalist remarked, some of the “secret” diplomatic cables resemble his Slate magazine dispatches.
The usage of such peculiar language and Hollywood slang is what detracts from the credibility of many of the diplomatic cables, at least those pertaining to the Eurasian region. It could also be, as former National Security Adviser Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, that some WikiLeaks cables might be part of a “very pointed”, “clearly calculated” “seeding” by “interested intelligence parties who want to manipulate the process and achieve certain very specific objectives”.
A case in point is the 24 February 2010 cable No 134 from Baku, which mentions, among other things, Turkey, and specifically, the writer of that dispatch, Charge d’Affairs Donald Lu, claims that in the words of President Aliyev the natural gas “sale [by SOCAR to Gazprom] illustrated to ‘our Turkish friends’ that they will not be allowed to create a gas distribution hub”. (http://WikiLeaks.ch/cable/2010/02/10BAKU134.html)
This wording by Lu created some misunderstanding in Turkish circles, sounding as if Azerbaijan said publicly one thing, but privately another, or, to put it simply, is somehow opposed to Turkish energy and geo-economic ambitions. Of course, pundits that claim this either do not know anything about the geo-economic impact of Azerbaijani-Turkish energy cooperation or are acting maliciously.
First off, the sentence “they will not be allowed to create a gas distribution hub” are the words of Mr Lu, which reflect his opinion on the issue. Secondly, there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what a “gas distribution hub” country would mean. This was recently meticulously noted by Jamestown Foundation analyst Vladimir Socor: “[A] ‘gas hub,’ however, is not the same as gas transit country. A hub country buys another country’s gas, stores it and re-sells it as its own gas to third countries at a higher price. A transit country, however, provides transit service through pipelines on its territory for an agreed [cost-based] fee, enabling the producer country to enter into direct commercial relations with the customers for its gas.”
While journalists and non-energy experts often use the term “energy hub” implying simply a focal point for energy deliveries and shipping, the meaning of this term could be more narrow and denote the right to re-sell energy supplies as your own. Needless to say, all energy producers, and producers in general, resist such attempts and Azerbaijan is no exception. There is nothing new in that Azerbaijan wants to sell its oil and gas as its own to the end consumer. This is a norm in business.
In other words, “gas hub” is not the same as “gas transit country”, which has been the agreed for Turkey since the mid-1990s, i.e., from the very inception of the Baku-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines, which placed Turkey and Azerbaijan on the world energy map, and have boosted their rising geopolitical significance.
From BTC alone, Turkey earns between $140 million and $292 million in transit revenues, annually, for 40 years. Since Turkey can only collect highly regulated low fees for the passage of oil and gas tankers through the environmentally sensitive Bosporus Straits, it is gaining higher transit fees as a result of the BTC and BTE pipelines. This does not include the direct and indirect investment (although, according to the Adana Chamber of Commerce, back in 2007 total investment in Ceyhan had already reached $11 billion due to BTC), the 6.75% and 9% stake of TPAO in Azerbaijani multi-billion dollar ACG oil and Shah Deniz gas projects respectively, the short-term and long-term employment the pipelines and railway bring, the price discount and supply stability from the Azerbaijani oil and gas supplies and many other tangible and intangible economic benefits.
Thus, it is not that Azerbaijan was, is or could ever be opposed to Turkey becoming an energy power, oil and gas trade center, or a “hub”. That is not even possible, considering that Azerbaijan did far more for Turkish energy ambitions than any other country, and it is part of the Azerbaijani and Turkish vision to see the two nations connect and cooperate closely in all strategic spheres, such as energy.
In addition to the world-class pipelines BTC and BTE, Azerbaijan is now considering building one more gas pipeline to carry even more supplies from its massive gas deposits. Additionally, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are interconnecting their railways, to create the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku (KAB) railroad, whose cargo traffic would also include energy, and this does not include any possible future trans-Caspian supplies.
It should be noted that the current trade between the two nations stands at over $2 billion, with plans to increase it to $5 billion in the immediate future, according to Turkish State Minister for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan. Total investment between the two nations has reached $10 billion so far and is expected to increase to $15 billion after SOCAR's investment in the Petkim petrochemical complex.
If we put all these energy mega-projects together and consider that it is Azerbaijani oil and gas resources, along with the strategic choice that the Azerbaijani nation made, and assign a dollar value to it, we will quickly see that it is due to Azerbaijan that tens of billions of dollars have been invested in Turkey. Equally, due to the Turkish government's resolve, support and vision, stability of demand and diversity of energy export routes have been ensured, allowing Azerbaijan to profit and stand on its feet, becoming the third-richest Turkic economy on a per capita basis (after Turkey and Kazakhstan, respectively), and, according to the IMF, raising its GDP per capita from $500 in 1997 to over $5,700 today.
Therefore, both nations reinforce and complement each other, profiting along the way, advancing their respective national interests and enhancing geopolitical importance. The WikiLeaks and similar reports that periodically appear should be more carefully scrutinized and analysed before opinions and articles are published.
Adil Baguirov is the founding member of the Azerbaijan Turkey Historical Research Foundation, or ATAF, and co-founder of the US Turkic Network, or USTN.
Adil Bagirov
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