Interview with Lawrence Sheets, director of the International Crisis Group's Caucasus Project.
Q: The OSCE summit in Astana showed once again that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still a long way from being resolved. Why do you think no visible progress has been made? Why has the anticipated breakthrough not occurred?
A: The main reason why Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot achieve tangible progress in the talks – that is, an agreement on basic principles – is that they have been unable so far to reconcile their respective positions on a few, but fundamental, points. These concern the timing and modalities of a future vote on Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status and the conditions under which Armenian forces would withdraw from Kelbajar and Lachin. The second major problem is a nationalist backlash against the proposed compromise solution, particularly in some Armenian political circles. This backlash makes it potentially politically dangerous for President Sargsyan to accept the basic principles document under present circumstances. If Azerbaijan is interested in a peaceful resolution, it should show greater restraint in its rhetoric and engage in some confidence-building measures with the Armenian side. Such gestures could help decrease tensions and could make it easier for the Armenian government to engage constructively in the talks with Azerbaijan and to promote more pragmatic public discussions in Armenia on the substantive value of the basic principles.
Q: President Sargsyan said in Astana that If Azerbaijan were to resume war, Armenia would recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. What is your comment on this? What would Armenia get out of recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh?
A: Armenia’s formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence would make little practical difference, because regardless of whether Armenia formally recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh, in case of a new war, it is most likely to be directly involved in the hostilities with Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh Armenian forces will function as simply an extension of the Armenian armed forces. In fact, non-recognition has not created any obstacles to Armenia engaging with its ethnic kin in Nagorno-Karabakh so far. Armenia subsidizes a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh’s budget, calling it an “inter-state loan”, state institutions in Armenia sign “inter-governmental” agreements with the de facto institutions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian regular conscripts serve in the military units in Nagorno-Karabakh and so on. In short, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh today are highly integrated in political, economic and military spheres and this is what makes the difference on the ground. A decision on formal recognition would have a purely symbolic meaning. What matters the most is that a new war would be far more devastating than the first one, as this time two professional and much better equipped armies would be facing each other. Such a war would be a catastrophe for both the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples alike and, contrary to some speculations in both societies, would make the resolution of the conflict even more difficult.
Q: Let’s assume that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not resolved, Armenian-Turkish relations aren’t normalized, and Armenia remains in economic isolation. If Armenia continues to pursue the same policies, what does the future hold for it?
A: It is true that, because of the conflict, Armenia is today excluded from major regional projects involving Azerbaijan. The closed border with Turkey also limits economic growth opportunities for Armenia. But contrary to the widespread perception in Azerbaijan, such economic pressures have not made Armenia more accommodating in the peace talks. On the contrary, closed borders, particularly with Turkey, have allowed domestic hardliners to further nurture a siege mentality within Armenian society. Besides, the Armenian economy has over time adapted to the conditions of closed borders to its east and west. Of course, as long as Armenia has problems with its neighbours, it will be unable to fully develop and provide a more secure and prosperous future for its citizens. But neither will Azerbaijan be able to realize its full potential until the conflict is resolved. Peaceful transformation of the status quo is in the best long-term interests of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. The status quo is almost as bad an option as the resumption of hostilities, because its further prolongation serves to embitter and radicalize the sides, thus narrowing chances for a peaceful resolution in the future. To peacefully transform the status quo, both Armenia and Azerbaijan need to review their present policies. Baku should rethink its position on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, because Turkish-Armenian rapprochement may help Baku recover its lost territories better than the current stalemate. Yerevan should review its position on the basic principles, in view of the fact that it stands to gain more from peaceful change than from clinging to an untenable status quo.
Q: The USA and other Western countries recognize Georgia's territorial integrity and, in this respect, even put pressure on Russia. Why, don’t the USA, other Western countries and Russia make the same efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan?
A: I understand the frustration of many Azerbaijanis, who think that the EU and the USA are not as vocal about Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as they are in the case of Georgia. But regardless of diplomatic rhetoric, Azerbaijan is actually in a better situation than Georgia. In spite of the current stalemate in the talks, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at a much more advanced stage than the deeply frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike in Georgia’s case, there is an international consensus for resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, if not on the end-result, then on a roadmap to move forward. This consensus is built on the three fundamental principles of the non-use of force, territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. I wish we were at a similar advanced stage of talks for Georgia’s conflicts too.
Q: The ineffectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group became more apparent after the OSCE summit in Astana. Many experts say that the main reason for the failure is a clash of interests among the Minsk Group co-chairing countries in the South Caucasus. What do you think about it?
A: As I mentioned above, there is an international consensus over how to proceed with peaceful transformation of the dangerous status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. All three co-chairs of the Minsk Group share a common position on the need for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to swiftly finalize their agreement on the basic principles and then move on to working out a comprehensive peace agreement. The joint statements of the French, Russian and the US presidents in L’Aquila in 2009 and in Muskoka in 2010 signal their determination to encourage both sides to proceed along these principles.The Astana summit ended with little in the way of concrete results. But it was not a failure. The fact that both Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan agreed to a joint statement in which they committed their governments to seek a solution guided by the L’Aquila and Muskoka statements along with the general norms and principles of the international law can be characterized as a modest success. We at Crisis Group believe that neither the leaderships of Armenia and Azerbaijan, nor the Minsk Group mediators should allow the peace process to become sidetracked by the ongoing escalation. The international community, particularly the Minsk Group co-chairs, should keep up their concerted efforts and actively pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on the framework document on Basic Principles.
B.A.
News.AZ
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