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Karabakh Settlement Requires Constructive Public Discussions

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Interview with Tabib Huseynov, Caucasus analyst at the International Crisis Group.

Q: Could you tell me about the report you are working on at present?

A: The Crisis Group is currently working on a new policy briefing on Nagorno-Karabakh, which we hope to publish some time in January or February. The briefing will provide a snapshot of the peace talks throughout 2010 and will focus on the possible repercussions for regional security of the ongoing escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is obvious that if the peace talks fail, escalation is imminent and we at Crisis Group are concerned that this may spiral out of control leading to a resumption of full-scale hostilities. So, the briefing is aimed at making an early warning for Armenia, Azerbaijan and the international mediators to avoid escalation and keep up their efforts to achieve a formal agreement on the basic principles document in the near future.

Q: WikiLeaks has published more US diplomatic cables from Baku than Yerevan, and some people see this as evidence of an Armenian hand in the publication. Do you think that attempts are being made to damage Azerbaijan through the WikiLeaks revelations?

A: There are a lot of conspiracy theories floating around about WikiLeaks. In Turkey, for example, there were similar suggestions that Israel might have been behind the leaks in order to harm Turkish interests. Claims are occasionally made around the world that the leaks were a deliberate plot by the US itself and that Julian Assange is a CIA agent. I think that reflecting on these conspiracy theories is a waste of time.

By revealing embarrassing details, the leaks affect virtually every country in the world and their impact is not limited to certain groups or categories of states. Armenia has been embarrassed by these leaks no less than Azerbaijan. The confidential information about Armenian covert sales of arms to Iran, which were later transferred to Iraq and ended up killing American soldiers there, is a case in point.

Q: How do you evaluate 2010 in terms of a Karabakh settlement?

A: 2010 was a year of missed opportunity for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to begin peacefully transforming the regional status quo in a mutually beneficial way. Instead of the much hoped for breakthrough, we witnessed a nationalist backlash, particularly in Armenia, against the internationally supported peace plan and growing bellicose rhetoric on both sides. The cease-fire violations became noticeably more frequent and the casualty figures on both sides nearly doubled in comparison with 2009, when the sides engaged in more dynamic and constructive discussions.

However, 2010 will also be remembered for small but important positive developments.

In mid-February, Azerbaijan for the first time officially announced its endorsement of the basic principles document. This endorsement demonstrated Baku’s constructive approach to the peace talks and now most of the eyes of the world are turned on Yerevan to show a similar approach.

The June Muskoka joint statement of the presidents of France, Russia and the US was another important development. It reiterated a similar statement by the mediator countries’ presidents in July 2009 in L’Aquila and was meant to send a strong message to both sides that the international community unanimously supports the peace plan and expects both sides to quickly finalize their agreement on it.

And finally, the 1 December joint statement of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the three mediator countries made on the sidelines of the OSCE’s Astana summit should be qualified as small diplomatic progress. In this joint declaration, the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents for the first time openly pledged to seek solutions based on the Muskoka and L’Aquila statements along with the general principles of international law. To translate from the diplomatic language, this means that both Baku and Yerevan agreed to seek solutions based on the basic principles document, the most important details of which were summarized in the six points in the Muskoka and L’Aquila statements. As I said in an earlier interview with News.Az, these published points constitute a sine qua non for all subsequent talks.

Q: Can progress on a Karabakh resolution be expected in 2011?

A: For there to be real progress, several conditions should be met. First, we need more pragmatic and constructive public discussions on the substance of the basic principles both within Armenian and Azerbaijani society and between them.

Second, it is difficult or even impossible to expect a breakthrough in the peace talks when both sides escalate tensions on the frontline and engage in bellicose rhetoric. To create a more constructive environment for talks, Armenia and Azerbaijan should pay greater attention to their public pronouncements and engage in some confidence-building activities across the frontline to reduce the number of incidents.

And finally, the international community and the mediators should keep the peace process at the centre of their attention. They should not view the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a “slow-burn” issue that can rumble on for years. The status quo is becoming increasingly unstable and difficult to sustain and its further continuation narrows the prospects for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Everyone with a stake in the region should understand that gradual peaceful change in the status quo is a far better option than gradual escalation with unpredictable consequences.

Q: There is an opinion that it is Russia rather than the more distant United States that is most important for settling the conflict. Anyway, is it important for Washington to reactivate its role in the negotiation process?

A: The current format for Minsk Group mediation, which combines Russia, the US and EU member France, is the best option that both Armenia and Azerbaijan can agree on, in spite of their occasional criticisms of the Minsk Group’s work. Effective mediation without any one of these co-chair countries’ representation and input is impossible.

When it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, all three co-chairs share a common position on the road map for peaceful resolution of the conflict and cooperate quite constructively among themselves to help Armenia and Azerbaijan come to an agreement on the basic principles document.

It is true that Russia, by virtue of its proximity to the region, seems more involved in the conflict and conflict resolution efforts. But it does not mean that Washington’s or Paris’ role in the mediation efforts is negligible. Although the Russians want to be seen as the ones leading the international mediation efforts, they actually are not interested in acting completely alone. Acting in tandem with the other two powers is more beneficial for Moscow, because it helps to reduce the damage to bilateral relations with either Armenia or Azerbaijan when pressure has to be brought to bear on them to make greater compromises and, also, it means Moscow does not assume sole responsibility for the failure of the mediation efforts. This is not to suggest, however, that Russia cannot do more to help the process move forward. It certainly can do more, particularly considering the extent of its political, economic and military influence on Armenia.

Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az

 

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