Nalbandian believes that the referendum in Southern Sudan can serve the solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem.
Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian does not know the theoretical foundations of the right of nations for self-determination. Before talking about something, he would rather read textbooks and at least explore some of the theoretical components of the issue. There is an impression that except for the name "the right of nations to self-determination", the Armenian Foreign Ministry does not know anything on the issue.
Nalbandian believes that the referendum in Southern Sudan can serve the solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem. The case of South Sudan cannot serve as a model for Nagorno-Karabakh, and much has been spoken in the media about this, as if anticipating possible optimistic statements of the Armenian official circles. Firstly, it is a domestic conflict, while the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is interstate, and secondly, in Sudan, we are dealing with self-determination coordinated between the states and referendum recognized by Khartoum, rather than unilateral forcible secession through external aggression and occupation of the territory of another state. Can it serve a precedent for Nagorno-Karabakh?
Eastern Timor also cannot be a precedent, either. It was recognized by the UN, and later by Indonesia, as a non-self-governing territory, and therefore, it is fully subject to the provisions of the UN Charter on non-self-governing territories. Nalbandian as the foreign minister should have been aware of it.
Most UN member-states he refers to cannot serve as a model for Nagorno-Karabakh, since they became independent states by implementing the right for self-determination in the decolonization process. The case of the Armenian national minority in Azerbaijan goes beyond the colonial context (and Terry Davis reminded it to Armenians during the visit to Yerevan saying ‘there is a great difference between Karabakh and recognition of its colonies by Great Britain. Karabakh is not a colony, it is rather a part of Azerbaijan) and essentially it has no big difference from the rights of the former Azerbaijani national minorities in Armenia.
Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia also do not help Yerevan in achieving the formalization of of a new state in Karabakh. In all three cases, we are witnessing violent secession against the consent of the central government, while the unilateral recognition by a number of states does not imply recognition by the international community. Only the recognizing states decided about the emergence of the three new states, while does not mean the whole world community or international law. Once the Taliban government also recognized ‘independent Ichkeria’ and Turkey recognized Northern Cyprus.
If Nalbandian is searching for a historical comparison for Nagorno-Karabakh, he should bear in mind that Karabakh is not legally a self-defining Caucasian Southern Sudan, it is the Caucasian Sudeten, occupied by Armenia. Imagine that Hungary occupied Vojvodina and requested external self-determination for the residents of this area, expelling Serbian population and occupied seven more cities. If Nalbandian believes that it is permissible and consistent with international law, he would allocate a portion of the territory of Armenia for a similar self-determination of ‘ Geycha-Zangezur’ people, whose rights are no different from the rights of the so-called ‘Karabakh. But Armenia wants to take Karabakh and not to share Zangezur. And after it Armenia accuses Azerbaijan of ‘wanting much and not giving something’.
Nalbandian complains that Azerbaijan allegedly accepts one principle of the three and one element of the six. This is an arbitrary interpretation of the position of Azerbaijan bordering with lies. Baku adopts all three principles and does not endorse any of them. It is ready for a peaceful settlement of the conflict (first principle), in which self-determination (second principle) does not lead to violation of territorial integrity (the third principle). This combination of the three principles in one goes complete harmony with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This is Armenia which actually prefers one principle – it wants such a self-determination, which crosses out another principle. There are no diversities of territorial integrity (as there are no diversities of virginity - it either exists or it does not, like you can also not be ‘a little pregnant’), while the international law envisions the inner and outer forms of self-determination.
Azerbaijan also accepts six of six elements. But Armenia wants to settle the issue in a package, while Azerbaijan wants it to settle in phases. How can a vote be held without the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied lands and without the return of Nagorno Karabakh residents to their homes? How is it possible to hold voting on the legal status of Nagorno Karabakh and settle the issue of the temporary status? This is an absurd!
Nalbandian’s words in the interview to Russia Today are the mere demagogy of a person who does not want progress in the negotiation process and, in addition, is ignorant or pretending to be ignorant of the theoretical foundations of the rights of nations for self-determination. Such a position is called destructive and Nalbandian and his deputies should not apply these words to Azerbaijan’s positions.
A.G.
News.Az
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