On Feb. 8, 2011, a report on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was published by the International Crisis Group, or ICG, that announced the risk of renewed war over the conflict as follows: “War in Nagorno-Karabakh can start any moment.”
In recent times, frequent breaches of the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone have demonstrated the fragility and instability of the situation at the ceasefire line. Even if there has been no return to full-scale hostilities, this fact increases the probability of new war.
Certainly many years of negotiations brokered by the OSCE Minsk Group, consisting of co-chairs from Russia, the U.S. and France, have failed to produce any legitimate agreements. Several attempts were made, but few produced results; for example the 2001 Key West summit hosted by the U.S. Administration, and the 2006 Rambouillet talks. Only on Nov. 20, 2008 was the Moscow declaration reached, by Russian attempts; it was the second agreement after the ceasefire agreement in 1994. Consequently, many politicians believe that Russia is the “key” actor/factor for the solution of this conflict. Thus, the status quo of the conflict does not suggest any negotiated or formal solution and is very often manipulated as an easy and efficient tool in the hands of regional (Turkey, Iran) and global (Russia, the United States and the EU) powers for their respective regional and geo-strategic interests. However, while war over the conflict zone is a risk, the “best” and “worst” case scenarios for conflict resolution ought to be examined.
According to an optimistic or best-case scenario, diplomatic efforts around a Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution could lead to the signing by the end of this year of a Declaration of Basic Principles of Conflict Resolution, followed by a political settlement agreement in the future (in 2012). For the successful implementation of this scenario it is important that a consensus be reached between the key players in global politics, the United States, the EU and Russia, who can act as principal mediators in the Karabakh resolution process (the EU as represented by France), with Turkey's involvement in the process as a regional power. Under this scenario, the Armenian community of Karabakh would be granted a high degree of autonomy with de facto absolute economic self-sufficiency and political self-government; the only exception would be that it could not conduct its own foreign policy. In addition to such investments, Nagorno-Karabakh would receive substantial subsidies from Azerbaijan's national budget.
According to a pessimistic or worst-case scenario, military provocations around the conflict area could lead to war. Recently intensified skirmishes around Nagorno-Karabakh risk spiraling out of control, in the heart of a key energy transit region. It is clear that aspects of a resumed war may represent drawbacks for Azerbaijan, however. New military operations could disrupt investment in the Azerbaijani economy and slow down successful economic development. On the other hand, a new war may create serious problems for the pipeline politics of Azerbaijan as well as Europe.
Four elements affecting the settlement process that directly affect the risk of war:
First, the global and regional interests of the major powers and their present interrelationships;
Second, the dominant trends in international relations as manifested in the agendas and decisions of international organizations;
Third, the conflicting sides' current political and economic situation;
Finally, the conflicting sides' diplomatic approaches, convictions and capacity to shape the peace process.
Thus, these elements will be decisive in realizing both the “worst possible” war scenario as well as the “best possible” one. In fact, it is hard to maintain an equilibrium of interests in Azerbaijan without somehow addressing the fact of the Armenian occupation. The Azerbaijani government is facing a challenge of changing conditions, which may soon make continuous outright rejection of a military option politically unsustainable. Azerbaijan’s population has consistently ranked the ongoing occupation as their number-one problem; the 17 years of the ceasefire have not reduced the urgency of the conflict for the Azerbaijani public, but, on the contrary, decreased hopes for a peaceful outcome. Thus, up until now, Azerbaijan has supported the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries’ consensus on a general framework for peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This consensus is based on a set of basic principles and was reflected in the 2009 L’Aquila and 2010 Muskoka joint statements of presidents Obama, Medvedev and Sarkozy.
In the near future, the artificial impediments to a diplomatic solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict posed by Armenia will only further discredit the diplomatic process, a persistence that thwarts the peace negotiations. It will embolden more radical voices within Azerbaijani society and make an already difficult decision-making environment for both leaders even more challenging. Therefore, an agreement between the two sides has become a very distant possibility.
* Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan.
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