Interview with Tomasz Sikorski, the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
Q: Do you believe in improvements of relations between Poland and Russia and how soon it could happen?
A: Actually it have already happened. There was a couple of strategic changes. The sincere and common mourning of Russians and Poles after catastrophe of 10 April, 2010 symbolised improved relations, but in fact couple of factors were in favour of this improvement long time before.
Firstly, the political situation in Poland. The government changed in autumn 2007. I don't want to evaluate here the policy of any Polish government, and to discuss, which way is better. The undisputable fact is, however, that the new government is more pragmatic towards Russia than the previous one. The new president, elected in July 2010, is also more pragmatic and made couple of gestures towards Russians.
Secondly, the change in the society. Still persists the suspiciousness towards Russia and russophobia (often caused by the grieviances of the past), sometimes loud and visible (especially during the investigation of the causes of 10 April catastrophe), but these feelings are decreasing. According to the opinion polls, the positive feeling towards Russia outnumber negative in Poland. And vice versa - more Russians think positively of Poles than negatively. So, the stereotypes remain, but when we put it into context, it turns out that the mutual perception is good. Not "splendid", not "very good", but not "bad" either.
Thirdly, the political situation in Russia. It seems that after war in Georgia in August 2008 and gas crisis with Ukraine during winter 2009 the European scepticism - sometimes even suspiciousness - towards Russia increased. It was also a sign for Moscow, that it doesn't pay to be very assertive, because it's easy to scare the EU off. And the crisis showed that the Russian economy was not so effective as it seemed, also the prices and the demand for gas and oil felt, which all accounted for decreasing Russian leverage over the EU. In my opinion, Russian authorities noticed this change and reacted quickly by adjusting its policy.
Finally, the position of Poland in the EU. I am far for saying, that Poland is treated as the sole 'specialist' on Russia. No, it isn't, but it's opinion is more visible and understood in Brussels now, than in, say, 2004 (when we were entering the EU). What does it mean? It is not so profitable for Russia to be conflicted with Poland, because it is no longer the matter of relations with Poland. It might spoil the relations with the EU.
These were the factors. Now, moving on to the perspectives: the economic cooperation is improving. There is lots to be done in trans-border issues between Poland and Russian Kaliningrad's Oblast', including improving the border control and making it quicker. Poland was in favour of inviting Russia to the Group of Friends of the Eastern Partnership and still is. Poland is also extremely in favour of Russia joining the WTO. The common projects, for example integration of energy systems and trade in energy between Poland and Kaliningrad's oblast' need feasibility study, but there is political will to push them on. It also seems, that lots of historical issues were fixed, although the stance of Poland remains, that all of the Russian documents connected with Katyn massacre should be de-classified.
Q: Poland says that always ready to help Azerbaijan to become member of EU and NATO. How can you explain that support and what can be done in this regard? Poland and Azerbaijan are the same history of coexisting in post-socialist space. Are there similarities in the Euro integration process of the two countries and are the place for exchange of experience?
A: I think these questions might be discussed together.
In Poland there is wide understanding, that all of the states, which meet the criteria of NATO and the EU membership should be given the perspectives of the accession. The eventual accession of Azerbaijan to either NATO or the EU is a long-time perspective and there are lots to be done. Probably the most valuable aspect of our support are our experiences of transforming the economy and the politics from the communism to the market economy and the liberal state. It is extremely hard job, to change the laws, accept the standards, modernise the all aspects of public life. Our experts are sharing the experiences with Georgians and they consider it to be valuable.
Speaking about similarities: actually, in Poland we were very determined to become a part of the NATO and the EU. Our 1990s were quite hard, but with defined goal, which was achieved. We joined the NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. In Azerbaijan the story was different. Because of the sad war and collapse of the state structures, the situation of Azerbaijan was definitely harder than in Poland. It also means that challenges were different. After 1993/94 it seems to me, that Azerbaijan chose the multilateral strategy, which means maintaing good relations with large players in the region (which is quite similar to Poland), but also avoiding integration with any of them (which is different from Poland). The independence, sovereignty and balancing between different states - these are the main indications of Azerbaijani policy. That is very different from Polish and if we speak about that sort of geopolitics, there is no similarities.
Q: What do you think about prospects of the Karabakh settlement?
A: Bleak, I am afraid. I don't see space for agreement. From Azerbaijani side, the autonomy for Karabakh it is the biggest concession. For Armenians from Karabakh, the withdrawal of forces from Lachin corridor is their biggest concession. There is no will for signing a peace, because the conditions diverge too much.
And I don't see the perspectives for military solution either. Azerbaijan improved and modernised its army. According to military experts, there is a balance between forces of Azerbaijan on the one side and Armenia plus separatists from Nagorno Karabakh on the other. This balance will shift in favour of Azerbaijan, but Armenia improved its strategic position, extending the agreement with Russia up to 2044. No way for Blitzkrieg then.
And it is unrealistic to expect something like 1995 in former Yugoslavia, where the American fighter jets "imposed" the peace upon Serbs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Because in the region of South Caucasus there will be no international agreement on intervention of any "large" state against any part of the conflict.
But if one ask me for advise, I'd say: talk. Talk with each other. Any better idea?
Q: The co-chairs of the Minsk group are Russia, U.S. and France. And what kind of role can EU play in the Karabakh process?
A: In my private opinion, it might be a good idea for the EU to enter the Minsk Group (instead of France) in order to improve the security in the EU neighborhood. At least that is, what should be done in the ideal world.
Lots of problems emerge, however. Firstly, France is not likely to resign from chairing the Minsk Group, which is quite understandable. Next, if the EU would try to co-chair the talks, it should present coherent position in the talks. But that could be solved. The biggest problem, however, is how to convince Armenia and Azerbaijan to work out the deal. I am afraid it's impossible without some sort of pressure: and the EU is not good in pressuring the states to do something they are extremely unwilling to do. Since the EU haven't gave the clear perspectives of membership, its leverage over Armenia and over Azerbaijan is very small. So engaging in the Minsk Group means that the EU will join the Group only to fail. That's why I am sceptical about it.
Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az
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