Interview with Jeff Goldstein, senior policy analyst for Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations' Washington, DC office.
Q: Do you share the view that the South Caucasus is no longer a priority for American policy in the post-Soviet area?
A: The US government focuses on strategic priorities and urgent crises or opportunities. Right now, events in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and China are the focus of attention in Washington. Russia policy is important in large part because Russia has a role to play in many of these areas. As US-Pakistan relations have become more unstable, Central Asia has become more important to the United States, as it presents the only realistic alternative route for supplying US troops in Afghanistan.
The South Caucasus is less relevant to the major strategic issues on which the US government is focusing. However, this does not mean that the US government has lost interest in the region. Georgian-Russian tensions, the flow of supplies to Afghanistan across the region, tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Turkish-Armenian reconciliation are all issues that Washington still cares about.
Q: Is the South Caucasus still an arena of geopolitical competition between the US and Russia or, as some experts say, did the Russian-Georgian war show that Russia remained the main power in the region?
A: I am sure there are people in both the Russian and American governments who see things that way. But neither government is a monolith. The Obama administration’s significant investment in the reset policy demonstrates that there are also people who are looking to change the dynamic in US-Russian relations, including in the South Caucasus.
Clearly, Russian-Georgian relations are a major impediment to these efforts. But I think that it’s instructive to note that even here, on the issue of Russia's World Trade Organization accession it appears that the US is doing its best to help find a way forward.
Q: Russia at the moment is more active as a mediator in the Karabakh settlement than the US and France. Could this activity bring positive results?
A: I do not believe that the governments in Baku or Yerevan have the political will to make the compromises necessary to secure a mutually acceptable settlement. Nor do I believe that any of the outside mediators is invested enough or has enough leverage to force the parties to settle.
Ever since the ceasefire was signed, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have assured their publics that all of their key demands will be met in a settlement. That of course is impossible. A settlement will require compromise. But both governments lack democratic legitimacy. This makes compromise on an important and emotional issue such as Karabakh particularly risky for them. In the minds of government leaders in both Baku and Yerevan it’s far safer, and domestically more useful, to stick to a hard line. Moreover, the lack of media freedoms and severe limits on non-governmental groups, particularly in Azerbaijan, make it impossible for there to be a serious, open, public debate on the pros and cons of the various compromise formulas that might facilitate a settlement.
Until these dynamics change, I can’t say that I am optimistic about the chances for a Karabakh settlement.
Q: The Armenian side sees Kosovo, Sudan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as potential precedents for an independent Karabakh. Do you see Karabakh as an independent state recognized by the international community in the future?
A: The final status of Karabakh will depend on the terms of a settlement. As I do not see much hope for progress towards a settlement in the foreseeable future, it is impossible to prognosticate on Karabakh’s ultimate status.
Q: On the other hand, Baku says that Azerbaijan is richer and more confident than it was 10 years ago and its army carries more political clout because of the high military budget. Could this influence Armenia? And how likely is the threat of a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
A: I do not think that Azerbaijan’s investments in its military have changed the military balance sufficiently to alter the current stalemate. I don’t believe that either side will intentionally start a war in the near future. Unfortunately, history tells us that wars sometimes begin unintentionally as the result of a series of unfortunate events. Given how close the frontline troops are to each other along the Line of Contact you can’t rule out the possibility of an initially small, localized clash spiraling out of control. Nevertheless, I don’t think these chances are large, as both sides realize that the consequences of a new war are unpredictable and likely to leave them worse off than they are now.
Jeff Goldstein is senior policy analyst for Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations' Washington, DC office. He is a retired American diplomat, having served, among other assignments, as the deputy to the US co-chairman of the Minsk Group in 2002-2004.
Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az
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