Interview with Niyazi Niyazov, head of the Graduate School of International Relations at the St. Petersburg State University.
Q: For a short period of time Azerbaijani Armed Forces held large-scale exercises on the front line under the direct command of Defense Minister of Azerbaijan Safar Abiyev. Do you think it points to possible impending military resolution of the Karabakh conflict?
A: I can not say that these exercises will be the starting point for Azerbaijan to chose a path of military solution to the conflict, but no doubt that the development of military security system of Azerbaijan is primarily aimed at liberation of the occupied parts of the country.
Therefore, we always emphasize in our works and speeches that statements by the Azerbaijani political and military leadership about possible use of military force to liberate occupied territories are not of just declarative nature since there are a number of objective factors pushing Azerbaijan to a military solution to the conflict. They are as follows:
1. Political. Azerbaijani state will be seen as successful by the population if today the republic regains full control over its sovereign territory. In this case, already fragmented political opposition will lose remnants of his influence on Azerbaijani society and will not be able to by play Karabakh or any other card to return to power and plunge the country into new political crisis to get its actions approved by the West.
2. Economic. Increasing financial resources of Azerbaijan require their effective use and distribution. Rapid modernization of Azerbaijan's economy is not able to absorb all the surplus money coming into the country. It is for this reason that Azerbaijan is actively developing its infrastructure, investing in social facilities and military-industrial complex. From this perspective, the investment attractiveness of Karabakh is enormous. Accordingly, the return of Karabakh, including its mountainous part, to Azerbaijan's economy is a necessity for the country;
3. Geopolitical and military. First and foremost, it is associated with exacerbation of the Iranian nuclear issue. In case Washington or Tel Aviv decide to start a war with Iran, Azerbaijan, at least, could face a huge number of refugees, ethnic Azerbaijanis, from that country, and Azerbaijan may be drawn into the conflict at most. Iran may deal a blow to Azerbaijan, motivating it by a need to weaken Western influence "on its northern borders.” In this case, Azerbaijan may actually be involved in a war on two fronts. Azerbaijani military experts also say this. Therefore, elimination of the Karabakh front is imperative for Baku.
Armenia’s new territorial claims against Azerbaijan push the Azerbaijani side to the war. So, as of late those in Armenia have begun to build projects to create new trade routes in the region bypassing Russia to ensure development of trade between Europe and Asia, not through the territory of Azerbaijan, but Iran and Armenia. Yerevan believes Nakhchivan should be annexed to Armenia to ensure successful implementation of this idea. I think there is no need to convince someone that such "ideas" only push Baku to a military solution to the conflict.
Q: Recently Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan asked the CSTO member countries to help Armenia in case of a possible war with Azerbaijan…
A: Armenia’s hopes that CSTO will side with Armenia in case of resumed hostilities with Azerbaijan are utopia.
Undoubtedly, the Secretariat of the organization, headed by Bordyuzha, often makes incorrect statements against Azerbaijan, but it must be clearly understood that decisions to use military potential of CSTO are made by heads of states of the countries included in this structure, but not the Secretariat of the organization as their position is obvious.
None of the CSTO countries will support Armenia in the event of renewed hostilities. Each of the CSTO countries are linked with Azerbaijan with more agreements, including military ones, than with Armenia.
As to Russia’s possible participation in the conflict on the side of Armenia, experts have different opinions. Russia’s possible participation in the conflict is spoken about much in Armenia than in Azerbaijan. In this case, a few points are completely disregarded:
First of all, Russia, engaged in forming its new foreign and domestic policies, will not openly support Armenia as it was in 1990s;
Secondly, the level of economic cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan is high as never before;
Third, in wake of the August 2008 war and Georgia’s denouncing agreement with Russia to transport military cargo to Armenia in April 2011, it would be hard, to be exact, impossible for Russia to deliver military technology to Armenia.
Despite this, one needs to admit that those who perceive the peace, including the Karabakh conflict, through the prism of global confrontation, characteristic of the Cold War, still have firm foothold in Russia and believe that its limbo will allow Moscow to protect themselves, for example, from NATO expansion.
Perhaps their arguments will be perceived less convincing for the Russian public, which disapproves rapprochement of NATO’s military structures to Russia's borders, when Azerbaijan’s membership in the Non-Aligned Movement becomes a fact.
Q: What will happen around Nagorno-Karabakh conflict given increased mediation efforts by Russia?
A: Moscow needs to convince the Armenian side that there is a need to make real, not but declarative steps to resolve the Karabakh problem.
First and foremost, this requires Russia to realize that settlement of the conflict meets interests of not only Azerbaijan and Armenia, but Russia itself, which today has to care about the Armenian economy, which has not been able to operate normally due to the existing conflict, as it has very few sales markets due to closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Moreover, failure of negotiating process under Moscow’s auspices may be another serious blow to Russia’s credibility in the CIS, which certainly does not meet the strategic interests of Russia.
Q: May the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries offer a new way of peaceful solution of the conflict to the conflicting parties?
A: We think there is no such a plan and it can hardly appear in the foreseeable future. In the best case, there will be some form of modernization of the so-called Madrid principles.
The fact is that any plan could eventually be realized if only the Armenian side agrees to leave occupied territories. But it seems Yerevan is not ready for this as more and more people there call to completely abandon the Madrid principles.
Q: May Iran get involved in Karabakh conflict resolution as another mediator?
A: I think it may not. It is another diplomatic game by Yerevan, which is ready to do anything, even to draw Iran as another mediator in an attempt to delay the moment it will make a decision to withdraw from Azerbaijani territory.
Apparently, Yerevan seeks to use Iran in its regional policy directed against Azerbaijan and Turkey.
On its part, Tehran would welcome to participate in this process, as it would raise its credibility in the eyes of Western public opinion and would pull it out from the diplomatic blockade, in which the country ended up because of its nuclear program and calling conduct in the international arena.
I think that the U.S. and France, reinforcing political and economic pressure on Tehran, will not give consent to Iran’s involvement in Karabakh conflict settlement, despite dreams of Yerevan and Tehran. Admittedly, this does not mean that they will increase political pressure on Armenia demanding it to withdraw from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
News.Az interviews Niyazi Niyazov, candidate of historical sciences, associate professor and head of the Graduate School of International Relations at the St. Petersburg State University.
Hamid Hamidov (Moscow, Russia)
News.Az
| < Prev | Next > |
|---|
