Interview with Laurence Broers, Caucasus Programme Projects Manager, Conciliation Resources.
Q: How did the Russian-Georgian war influence the Karabakh settlement?
A: Russian-Georgian confrontation obviously had a negative effect for the South Caucasus as a whole, reinforcing the image of this region as an unstable and unpredictable conflict zone. But there may be some indirect benefits for the Karabakh peace process, should people choose to see them. First, while Russia's efforts to increase its profile as a positive mediator in the Karabakh dispute are to be welcomed, the unfortunate lack of tangible results to come out of the Moscow Declaration and what has been called the 'Medvedev moment' in Kazan are a reminder that no single outside power can impose a settlement.
The change that we need to see to take the Karabakh peace process forward has to come from within, with outside support - and not the other way round. Second, the war in and around South Ossetia highlighted the cost to both Armenians and Azeris of even (relatively) minor transport and transit disruptions. Imagine the impact renewed Armenian-Azerbaijani war would have.
Third, with Georgia's peace processes effectively stalled for the foreseeable future, the August war has also motivated greater interest and made more resources available for international engagement on Karabakh. Although this revived international interest in what was a forgotten peace process is welcome, it also needs careful coordination and management. Finally, the five-day war underlined the point that violence cannot resolve the South Caucasus conflicts. A new status quo can be imposed by force, but everyone affected by the Karabakh conflict knows, status quo is not the same as peace.
Q: Do you think that Russia after war with Georgia could really help to settle the Karabakh conflict?
A: Russia’s capacities, influence and interests in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are qualitatively different from those in Georgian affairs. Although it is difficult to imagine a viable settlement to the Karabakh conflict that Russia does not agree with, Moscow has fewer options to impose its own choice of status quo or indeed to force a settlement. Russia has a vital and positive role to play in underpinning and supporting any eventual resolution of the Karabakh conflict.
In this context, the reported personal rapport between President Medvedev and Presidents Aliyev and Sarkisian is significant, and President Medvedev can still play an important convening and supporting role. But Russian influence is not enough to overcome the much deeper problems and dysfunctions in the Karabakh conflict, as Kazan has shown. What is much more important is the strategies that Azerbaijani and Armenian authorities adopt towards the peace process, and towards situating the Karabakh conflict in their relationships with their own societies.
Q: Do you see differences in public and authorities’ attitude to the Karabakh problem?
A: There is a long-standing stereotype in the Karabakh peace process that the “presidents are ahead of their peoples”. According to this stereotype, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan would have come to a settlement long ago if only their societies were not so radical. But the presidents in neither country have engaged their societies in an honest debate about the possibilities for settlement. Karabakh is the joker in the pack for the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the one issue that they really cannot control or predict.
Their attitude is to contain this issue as much as they can, to monopolize it and to define the boundaries of what can be said about it. This plays out differently in Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, because one side is more or less happy with the status quo and the other is not. In Armenian societies there is less pressure to criticize the authorities’ handling of the issue. In Azerbaijan, as the party less satisfied with the status quo, there is more pressure. But even if we think that societal and authorities’ attitudes on the Karabakh problem are more or less compatible, there are many other issues where state and society clearly do not agree. If they do not agree on fundamental issues like governance, human rights, political participation and so on, then of course, they will not be able to agree on a process to address the Karabakh problem. ‘Agreement’ on Karabakh can mask disagreement on other issues of equal importance.
Q: Are you sure that Armenians are ready to live in peace with Azeries?
A: This is surely a two-way question: are Armenians and Azeris ready to live in peace with each other? In the current climate, in which there is practically no Armenian-Azeri contact and a lot of negative propaganda and stereotyping circulating within each society, it’s difficult to talk about readiness to live in peace. Is either side ready, for example, to accept returnees from the other side? Can Azeris be expected to accept people they know only as "Armenian aggressors"? Can Karabakh Armenians be expected to be ready to accept Azeris when they are increasingly educated to believe that occupied territories are 'liberated territories'? I do not think any of the societies involved are ready for this at this point.
This issue is part of the broader question of whether either side is ready to acknowledge the grievance and loss of the other. It’s only when Armenians and Azeris can share a common understanding of their history, and of their future together, that they will be ready to live in peace. In all cases, a deep transformation of all the societies is needed before this can happen. The Turkish-Armenian relationship offers some pointers here, as in that situation free people-to-people contacts have kept an idea alive when the formal diplomatic process has collapsed. The Turkish-Armenian experience also underlines the long-term nature of this process.
Q: Azerbaijan's spiritual leader, Sheikh Allashukur Pashazade has received an invitation to visit Armenia in November to attend a CIS Inter-Religious Council meeting. As you know Armenian spiritual leader Garegin II visited Baku last year. Do you think that A.Pashazade will visit Yerevan?
A: I hope he will. And if he does, I hope that this will become a step in a process to normalize such visits. When such visits happen in a one-off or occasional way, they can be damaging because of high expectations and media hype. Such visits need to become part of the repertoire of how Armenian and Azerbaijani societies can reconnect despite all the difficulties. Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities could go further down this path to begin a process of cooperation and mutual consultation on the preservation of cultural heritage.
The intermingled nature of Armenian and Azerbaijani populations prior to the conflict means that each side is in control of cultural and religious monuments of special significance to the other. Just as churches formerly frequented by Armenians stand empty in Azerbaijan, mosques formerly frequented by Azerbaijanis stand empty in Nagorny Karabakh. There have been regular mutual recriminations over the alleged effacement of cultural heritage, made worse by the lack of access and information. When restoration of monuments does take place, it creates fears that the “national character” of such monuments is being deliberately diluted or worse. Reciprocal moves to share the future of cultural heritage, or indeed unilateral gestures of goodwill, could ease these tensions. These do not need to be wide-ranging in order to be significant at this point.
Just allowing the other side visiting rights and a say in how heritage is curated is enough to begin a meaningful dialogue. The Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II and Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade could promote and provide leadership for this kind of initiative, as well as providing the vital message to the outside world that the Karabakh conflict is not about religion.
Q: What kind of role may such kind of visits play in the Karabakh settlement?
A: The massive highs and lows of expectation and disappointment in the Minsk Group-mediated negotiations could be lessened by a steady process of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. The eventual outcome of the Karabakh peace process will need reserves of mutual confidence and renewed trust. Cross-conflict visits can begin this process now, by reducing misperception and misinformation and allowing Armenians and Azeris to renew their relationships as individuals. For Armenians, better acquaintance with Azerbaijan means better acquaintance with an adversary and neighbor undergoing far-reaching social change. No one is clear, as yet, where this change is taking Azerbaijani society, but it would be foolish to ignore the development that is taking place.
For Azerbaijanis, civil society-level visits can open a necessary, alternative path to Baku’s official definition of the conflict as an inter-state conflict with Armenia. One way or another, Baku needs to find a way to talk to the population living in Nagorny Karabakh today, which it claims as its own. There is a clear contradiction between seeking to reincorporate this population and discouraging the free movement of Armenians to Azerbaijan. Opening up the peace process to allow for reciprocal visits can begin to address these problems.
There is a long-standing tendency for Armenians and Azeris to prioritize communication with outside powers over communication with each other. But what do Armenians and Azeris have to lose by talking to each other? And will they ever be ready to live in peace if they don't?
F.H.
News.Az
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